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1 Introduction
A number of emerging economies are experiencing fast income growth and convergence to developed
economies, improving signicantly the average living standards of their populations. Their success
is often accompanied by increasing disparities, of which intergenerational inequality is an important
component. In China, for instance, the present value of earnings for a worker who entered the labor
force in 2000 is on average about six times as large as that of a worker who entered in 1970, when
China was one of the poorest countries in the world. While young Chinese workers today face much
better prospects than did their parents, poverty among the elderly is pervasive, aggravated by the
gradual demise of traditional forms of family insurance (Almås and Johnsen 2013, Park et al. 2012,
Yang 2011, and Yang and Chen 2010).
In this paper, we study how alternative pension systems enable di¤erent generations to share the
benets of high growth in emerging countries. We construct an overlapping generation (OLG) model
where the economy is initially on a fast convergence trajectory, followed by a slowdown as steady state
is approached. We calibrate the model to China based on our earlier work in Song et al. (2011),
henceforth, SSZ. The model embeds key trends of the growth experience of China: a demographic
transition, rural-urban migration, fast wage growth expected to slow down in future, and nancial
market imperfections which repress the rate of return on householdssavings.
We use the theory to assess the nancial sustainability and welfare properties of alternative reforms.
In line with previous studies (e.g., Sin 2005), we nd that the current pension system is not nancially
sustainable, due to the unfavorable demographic transition that will increase the old age dependency
ratio in coming years. The welfare e¤ects of alternative sustainable reforms are evaluated from the
perspective of a benevolent planner who weighs the utility of di¤erent generations with a geometrically
declining weight. We take as a conservative benchmark a highly forward-looking (low-discount) planner
who has no desire to redistribute resources across generations in steady state. We show that in
emerging economies even this planner would like to redistribute resources to early generations because
these earn much lower wages than future generations. In fact, her optimal policy involves paying
generous pensions to the generations who are currently working or already retired, and negative
pensions to subsequent generations.1
We compare the optimal policy to (sustainable) pension reforms that are being discussed in the
policy debate. We start with an immediate reform adjusting benets so as to make the system long-
run sustainable (in the sense that the benets and taxes would not need any future adjustment. This
1 In our calibration, the low-discount planner has an annual discount rate of 0.5%. We show that the drive for
redistribution is stronger with a more impatient planner who is endowed, following Nordhaus (2007), with a social
discount rate equal to the market interest rate.
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policy, which we label as the benchmark reform, involves a draconian permanent reduction in the
replacement rate, from 60% to 39.1%, for all workers retiring after 2012 without reneging on the
outstanding obligations to current retirees. This implies the accumulation of a large pension fund
until 2052 to pay for the pensions of future generations retiring in times when the dependency ratio
will be very high. The benchmark reform entails large welfare losses relative to the optimal policy, as
it cuts pensions for the transition generations, while the planner would like to increase redistribution
towards them.
We consider three alternative reforms. The rst reform is a delayed reform, by which the current
rules of the Chinese system remain in place until a future date T . Then, benets are permanently
reduced so as to balance the pension system in the long run. The length of the delay is chosen so
as to maximize the low-discount planners utility. The optimal delay is until 2050, and this policy
yields large welfare gains for the transition generations relative to the benchmark reform in 2013. The
cohorts retiring between 2013 and 2050 would enjoy welfare gains equivalent, on average, to a 15.9%
increase in their lifetime consumption. Later cohorts would only su¤er small losses in the form of a
slightly lower replacement ratio (and by assumption, all those who retired by 2012 are una¤ected).
The second reform is a fully funded (FF) reform that replaces the dened benet transfer-based
pension with a fully funded individual account system. To honor existing obligations, the government
issues bonds to compensate current workers and retirees for their past contributions. A standard trade-
o¤ emerges: all generations retiring after 2059 benet from the FF reform, whereas earlier generations
lose. On the one hand, the FF reform reduces tax distortions on labor supply. On the other hand, it
eliminates a redistributive policy that the planner values. We nd that both the low-discount planner
and, a fortiori, the Nordhaus planner prefer the delayed reform to the FF reform.
The third reform is switching to an unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system where the replace-
ment rate is endogenously determined by the dependency ratio, subject to a sequence of balanced
budget conditions for the pension system. Given the demographic transition of China, the PAYGO
system yields very generous pensions to early cohorts at the expense of the generations retiring after
2045. This reform yields substantial welfare gains by allowing the poorer current generations to share
the benets of high wage growth with the richer generations entering the labor market when China is
a mature economy. The gains outweigh the losses originating from the larger labor supply distortion
relative to the FF reform.
The results above accrue in an otherwise standard model. We show that in a mature economy
where wages grow at a constant 2% per year, the planner would prefer a FF reform (or, alternatively,
the immediate draconian reform) to a delayed reform or to a pure PAYGO system.
The normative predictions of our analysis run against the common wisdom that switching to a
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pre-funded pension system is the best response for emerging economies facing adverse demographic
dynamics. For instance, Feldstein (1999), Feldstein and Liebman (2006) and Dunaway and Arora
(2007) argue that a fully funded reform is the best viable option for China. On the contrary, our
policy recommendations are in line with Barr and Diamond (2008), who argue against reforming the
pension system in the direction of pre-funded individual accounts.
Our results hinge on two typical features of emerging economies: a high wage growth during
transition and a low rate of return on savings (in spite of high returns on investments). In the Chinese
case, the forecast of a high wage growth reects the fact that Chinas GDP per capita is still below
20% of the US level, leaving ample room for further convergence in technology and productivity. The
low rate of return on savings reect the well-documented fact that China su¤ers from severe nancial
market underdevelopment. For instance, Allen et al. (2005) document that China has poor investor
protection, accounting standards, non-performing loans, etc. relative to its level of development.2
Our analysis illustrates a general point that applies to fast-growing emerging economies. Even for
economies that are dynamically e¢ cient, the combination of (i) a prolonged period of high wage
growth and (ii) a low return on nancial savings makes it possible to run a relatively generous pension
system over the transition without imposing a large burden on future generations.
We abstract from some potentially important features. First, we consider neither idiosyncratic
nor intergenerational risk. Both sources of risk are important and di¢ cult to insure in emerging
economies, strengthening the case for a non-funded pension system (see Krueger and Kubler 2006, and
Nishiyama and Smetters 2007). Second, we ignore within-cohort inequality. In reality, public pensions
also provide some intragenerational redistribution. Last but not least important, we do not consider
altruism within families. Public pensions could crowd out private transfers from children to the
elderly, reducing the social value of pensions. Although incorporating within-family intergenerational
transfers could weaken some of our results, such arrangements appear to be limited and declining
over the process of economic development. Cai et al. (2006) document that, although retirees in
urban China receive transfers from their children in response to negative income shocks (e.g., pension
arrears), such transfers provide only very limited insurance. For instance, when income is close to the
poverty line, a one yuan temporary reduction in income leads to an increase in net transfers between
10 and 16 cents. Their study concludes that improving the public pension system is unlikely to lead to
any signicant crowding out of private transfers. This conclusion is shared by Park et al. (2012) who
add that, irrespective of the public pension system, the e¤ectiveness of the informal private insurance
2Di¤erent from us, Feldstein (1999) assumes that the Chinese government has access to a risk-free annual rate of return
on the pension fund of 12%. Unsurprisingly, he nds that a fully funded system that collects pension contributions and
invests these funds at such a remarkable rate of return will dominate a PAYGO pension system that implicitly delivers
the same rate of return as aggregate wage growth.
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system is set to decline in future (as it did, for instance, in the recent history of Latin America), since
the elderly will have fewer children and more of them will live separately from their children (see also
Yang and Chen 2010, and Calvo and Williamson 2008).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derive some normative
implications. Section 3 calibrates the model to China, specifying the demographic dynamics, an
exogenous wage growth process and a set of pension rules. Section 4 studies the welfare e¤ects of
alternative pension reforms. Section 5 performs sensitivity analysis. Section 6 extends the analysis
to a rural pension system and section 7 concludes. The webpage appendix contains some technical
material and a description of the general equilibrium model based on SSZ upon which the forecasts
for wages and interest rates are based.
2 Model
This paper constructs a multiperiod OLG model to evaluate quantitatively the welfare implications of
alternative pension reforms of China. The model is close in spirit to Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987),
Conesa and Garriga (2008), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Huang et al. (1997), and Storesletten (2000).
2.1 Household problem
The model economy is populated by a sequence of overlapping generations of agents. Each agent lives
up to J   JC years and has an unconditional probability of surviving until age j equal to sj : During
their rst JC   1 years (childhood), agents are economically inactive, make no choices, and do not
derive any utility. Preferences are dened over consumption and leisure, and are represented by a
standard lifetime utility function,
Ut =
JX
j=0
sj
j
 
log (ct;j)  (ht;j)
1+ 1

1 + 1
!
; (1)
where  is the discount factor, c is consumption, and h is labor supply. Here, t denotes the period
in which the agent turns adult (i.e., becomes economically active), and j is the number of years since
entering adult life. Thus, Ut is the discounted utility of an agent born in period t  JC .
Workers are active until age JW . For simplicity, we abstract from an endogenous choice of re-
tirement. Incorporating endogenous retirement would require a more sophisticated model of labor
supply, including non-convexities in labor market participation and declining health and productivity
in old age, as in e.g. French (2005) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). Since China has a mandatory
retirement policy, the assumption of exogenous retirement seems reasonable. After retirement, agents
receive pension benets until death. Wages are subject to proportional social security taxes. Adult
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workers and retirees can borrow and deposit their savings with banks paying a gross annual interest
rate R. A perfect annuity market allows agents to insure against uncertainty about the time of death.
Agents maximize Ut, subject to a lifetime budget constraint,
JX
j=0
sj
Rj
ct;j =
JWX
j=0
sj
Rj
(1   t;j) $jt wt+j ht;j +
JX
j=JW+1
sj
Rj
bt;j ; (2)
where t + j denotes time, bt;j denotes the pension benet accruing in period t + j to a person who
became adult in period t, wt+j is the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit at t+j, t denotes the human capital
specic to the cohort turning adult in t,  t;j is the labor income tax, and $j is the e¢ ciency units
per hour worked for a worker with j years of experience capturing the experience-wage prole. We
abstract from within-cohort di¤erences in human capital. Thus, (1   t;j) $jt wt+j is the after-tax
hourly wage rate in period t+ j for a worker belonging to cohort t.
2.2 Optimal intergenerational redistribution for an emerging economy
To start with, we characterize the optimal pension policy which maximizes the utility of a benevolent
social planner who cares about all present and future generations, and discounts the future generations
utilities geometrically with a discount factor  2 (0; 1). The purpose is to illustrate the main point
of the paper, namely, that in emerging economies with fast but declining wage growth, even a social
planner with a very low social discount rate wishes to redistribute resources from future to current
generations. Moreover, the optimal redistribution can be implemented by a pension system that yields
a declining sequence of replacement rates.
The key assumption is that the wage growth is relatively fast in the beginning, and eventually
converges to a steady-state growth rate g. As discussed in the introduction, this captures a salient
feature of emerging economies. To convey the main message, we focus in this section on an economy
in which wages grow at the rate ~g > g until period T (where T > J) and at the rate g thereafter.
The insights generalize to arbitrary wage sequences featuring a decreasing growth rate. Again for
simplicity, we set $j = t = sj = 1.
3
The optimal allocation (rst best) maximizes
V0 =
1X
t=0
t
tUt; (3)
where Ut is dened in equation (1) and t is the population size of the cohort entering the labor
3This amounts to abstracting from human capital accumulation, a rising age prole of wages, and mortality before
age J . This is without loss of generality and the results are robust to allowing $j 6= 1, t 6= 1, and sj < 1. In the
quantitative analysis below, we restore all these features.
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market in period t.4 The maximization is subject to the following resource constraint:
1X
t=0
t
Rt
JX
j=0
ct;j
Rj
= A0 +
1X
t=0
t
Rt
JwX
j=0
wt+jht;j
Rj
; (4)
where A0 denotes the initial planners wealth net of promises to generations that enter the labor before
time zero. Note that, for the resource constraint to be well-dened, we must assume that, in the long
run, R > (1 + g) (1 + n), where n is the long-run population growth rate. This constraint guarantees
that the economy is dynamically e¢ cient. Moreover, we assume that  < (1 + n) 1, so as to ensure
that the transversality condition of the planners problem holds. Standard analysis yields the rst-best
allocation:
ct;0 = 
 1 (R)t ; (5)
ct;j = ct;0 (R)
j ; for j 2 f1; 2; :::; Jg; (6)
ht;j =

wt+j
ct;j

; for j 2 f0; 1; :::; Jwg: (7)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint (note that  is inversely
related to A0). The optimal consumption sequence is independent of the wage sequence. Over the
life cycle the planner chooses the same consumption growth as do individuals (see equation (6)),
whereas consumption grows across cohorts by the factor R (see equation (5)), independently of the
wage dynamics. Finally, labor supply is increasing the larger is the wage relative to consumption (see
equation (7)).
Next, suppose that the planner faces a standard implementability constraint: any (Ramsey) al-
location must be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose, in addition, that the only instrument at her
disposal is a pension system comprising a sequence of taxes and pension replacement rates ft;  tg1t=0,
where cohort ts labor income is taxed at the at rate  t, and the cohort receives a pension bt;j .
To achieve an analytical characterization, it is convenient to dene cohort ks pension replacement
rate k as the ratio between the present value of its pensions and that of its after-tax labor income:
k =
PJ
j=Jw+1
bk;jR
 j

=
PJw
j=0 (1   t)wk+jhk;jR j

, where hk;j is the average labor supply of
workers of cohort k with experience j.
The following proposition (proof in the appendix) establishes that the rst best can be implemented
by setting the tax rate to zero and choosing a suitable replacement rate sequence.
Proposition 1 The rst-best allocation can be implemented by a Ramsey sequence of cohort-specic
taxes and pension replacement rates. These sequences have the following characterization:
4We ignore the generations born before t = 0, since we assume that the planner cannot change the utility promised
to these generations.
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(1) Taxes are zero in all periods,  t;j = 0 for all t and j;
(2) The pension replacement rate sequence is:
1 + t+1
1 + t
=

R
1 + g
1+


1 + g
1 + ~g
1+
 F (t) ; (8)
where F (t) is a continuous non-decreasing function of the birth date t such that F (t) = 1 for all
t  T   Jw; F (t) =

1+~g
1+g
1+
> 1 for all t > T and F (t) is increasing in t for intermediate values.
The expressions for F (t) and 0 are given in the appendix.
The particular case in which  = (1 + g) =R is especially revealing. In this case, the planner would
engage in no intergenerational redistribution in a mature economy where ~g = g.5 However, if ~g > g;
the benet sequence is monotonically decreasing during the transition. Thus, the optimal pension
system redistributes resources from the steady-state generations to the transition generations.
In Proposition 1, some cohorts may earn negative pensions. It is straightforward to extend the
result to a setting where pensions are constrained to be non-negative (see Corollary 2 in the appendix).
In this case, pensions may be set to zero for some cohorts, and so these cohorts face positive social
security taxes. Finally, the theory yields the normative prediction that no generation should ever be
taxed when working and earn pension benets in old age, as this creates an ine¢ cient labor supply
wedge.
3 Parametrizing the model
This section parametrizes the model. We rst describe the demographic model, then calibrate the rest
of the model, and nally specify a pension system.
3.1 Demographic model
Since China faces a major demographic transition that a¤ects the viability of the pension system, we
construct in this section a detailed demographic model. We assume an exogenous population dynamics
model and provide a detailed account of internal rural-urban migration since this has important e¤ects
on the sustainability of the system.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the total fertility rate (henceforth, TFR) of China was between
ve and six. High fertility, together with declining mortality, brought about a rapid expansion of
the total population. The 1982 census estimates a population size of one billion, 70% higher than in
the 1953 census. The view that a booming population is a burden on the development process led
the government to introduce measures to curb fertility during the 1970s, culminating in the one-child
5To see why, note that the right-hand side of equation (8) would be unity if ~g = g, so t must be constant.
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policy of 1978. This policy imposes severe sanctions on couples having more than one child. The policy
underwent a few reforms and is currently more lenient to rural families and ethnic minorities. Todays
TFR is below replacement level, although there is no consensus about its exact level. Estimates based
on the 2000 census and earlier surveys range between 1.5 and 1.8 (e.g., Zhang and Zhao, 2006). Recent
estimates suggest a TFR of about 1.6 (Zeng 2007).
3.1.1 Natural population projections
We consider, rst, a model without rural-urban migration, which is referred to as the natural popu-
lation dynamics. We break down the population by birth place (rural vs. urban), age, and gender.
The initial population size and distribution are matched to the adjusted 2000 census data.6 There
is consensus among demographers that birth rates have been underreported, causing a decit of 30
to 37 million children in the 2000 census.7 To heed this concern, we take the rural-urban population
and age-gender distribution from the 2000 census with the subsequent National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS) revisions and then amend this by adding the missing children for each age group, according
to the estimates of Zhai and Chen (2007) (see also Goodkind 2004).
The initial group-specic mortality rates are also estimated from the 2000 census, yielding a life
expectancy at birth of 71.1 years, which is very close to the World Development Indicator gure in the
same year (71.2). Life expectancy is likely to continue to increase as China becomes richer. Therefore,
we set the mortality rates in 2020, 2050, and 2080 to match the demographic projection by Zeng
(2007) and use linear interpolation over the intermediate periods. We assume no further change after
2080. This implies a long-run life expectancy of 81.9 years.
The age-specic urban and rural fertility rates for 2000 and 2005 are estimated using the 2000
census and the 2005 one-percent population survey, respectively. We interpolate linearly the years
2001-2004, and assume age-specic fertility rates to remain constant at the 2005 level over the period
2006-2012. This yields average urban and rural TFRs of 1.2 and 1.98, respectively.8 Between 2013
and 2050, we assume age-specic fertility rates to remain constant in rural areas. In November 2013
the third plenum of the Chinese Communist Partys 18th Party Congress announced the plan allowing
couples to have two children if one of them is an only child. This policy has been rapidly implemented
6The 2000 census data are broadly regarded as a reliable source (see, e.g., Lavely, 2001; Goodkind, 2004). The total
population was originally estimated to be 1.24 billion, later revised by the NBS to 1.27 billion (see the Main Data Bulletin
of 2000 National Population Census). The NBS also adjusted the urban-to-rural population ratio from 36.9% to 36%.
7See Goodkind (2004). A similar estimate is obtained by Zhang and Cui (2003), who use primary school enrolments
to back out the actual child population.
8The acute gender imbalance is taken into account in our model. However, demographers view it as unlikely that
such imbalance will persist at the current high levels. Following Zeng (2007), we assume that the urban gender ratio
will decline linearly from 1.145 to 1.05 from 2000 to 2030, and that the rural gender imbalance falls from 1.19 to 1.06
over the same time interval. No change is assumed thereafter. Our results are robust to plausible changes in the gender
imbalance.
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by provinces. Zeng (2007) estimates that such a policy would increase the urban TFR from 1.2 to 1.8
(second scenario in Zeng, 2007). This is in line with the explicit target of the Chinese authorities, as
outlined by the National Health and Family Planning Commission (source: Xinhuanet November 15,
2013).
A long-run TFR of 1.8 implies an ever-shrinking population. We follow the United Nations pop-
ulation forecasts and assume that in the long run the population will be stable. This requires that
the TFR converges to 2.08, which is the reproduction rate in our model, in the long run. In order to
smooth the demographic change, we assume that both rural and urban fertility rates start growing in
2051, and we use a linear interpolation of the TFRs for the years 2051-2099. Since long-run forecasts
are subject to large uncertainty, we also consider an alternative scenario with lower fertility.
3.1.2 Rural-urban migration
Rural-urban migration has been a prominent feature of the Chinese economy since the 1990s. There
are two categories of rural-urban migrants. The rst category comprises all individuals who physically
move from rural to urban areas. It includes both people who change their registered permanent
residence (i.e., hukou workers) and people who reside and work in urban areas but retain an o¢ cial
residence in a rural area (non-hukou urban workers).9 The second category comprises all individuals
who do not move but whose place of registered residence switches from being classied as rural into
being classied as urban.10 We dene the sum of the two categories as the net migration ow (NMF).
We propose a simple model of migration where the age- and gender-specic emigration rates
are xed over time. Although emigration rates are likely to respond to the urban-rural wage gap,
pension and health care entitlements for migrants, the rural old-age dependency ratio, and so on,
we will abstract from this and maintain that the demographic development only depends on the age
distribution of rural workers. It is generally di¢ cult, even for developed countries, to predict the
internal migration patterns (see Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012). In China, pervasive legal and
administrative regulations compound this problem.
We start by estimating the NMF and its associated distribution across age and gender. This
9There are important di¤erences across these two subcategories. Most non resident workers are currently not covered
by any form of urban social insurance including pensions. However, some relaxation of the system has occurred in
recent years. The system underwent some reforms in 2005, and in 2006 the central government abolished the hukou
requirement for civil servants (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). Since there are no reliable estimates of the number of
non-hukou workers, and in addition there is uncertainty about how the legislation will evolve in future years, we decided
not to distinguish explicitly between the two categories of migrants in the model. This assumption is of importance with
regard to the coverage of di¤erent types of workers in the Chinese pension system. We return to this discussion below.
10This was a sizeable group in the 1990s: according to China Civil A¤airs Statistical Yearbooks, a total of 8,439 new
towns were established from 1990 to 2000 and 44 million rural citizens became urban citizens (Hu, 2003). However, the
importance of reclassied areas has declined after 2000. Only 24 prefectures were reclassied as prefecture-level cities in
2000-2009, while 88 prefectures were reclassied in 1991-2000.
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estimation is the backbone of our projection of migration and the implied rural and urban population
dynamics. We use the 2000 census to construct a projection of the natural rural and urban population
until 2005 based on the method described in section 3.1.1. We can then estimate the NMF and its
distribution across age groups by taking the di¤erence between the 2005 projection of the natural
population and the realized population distribution according to the 2005 survey.11 The technical
details of the estimation can be found in the appendix.
According to our estimates, the overall NMF between 2001 and 2005 was 88 million, corresponding
to 10.9% of the rural population in 2000.12 Survey data show that the urban population grows at an
annual 4.1% rate between 2000 and 2005. Hence, 89% of the Chinese urban population growth during
those years appears to be accounted for by rural-urban migration. Our estimate implies an annual
ow of 17.6 million migrants between 2001 to 2005, equal to an annual 2.3% of the rural population.
This gure is in line with estimates of earlier studies. For instance, Hu (2003) estimates an annual
ow between 17.5 and 19.5 million in the period 19962000.
The estimated age-gender-specic migration rates are shown in gure 1. Both the female and male
migration rates peak at age fteen, with 15.4% for females and 12.1% for males. The migration rate
falls gradually at later ages, remaining above 1% until age thirty-nine for females and until age forty
for males. Migration becomes negligible after age forty.
To incorporate rural-urban migration in our population projection, we make two assumptions.
First, the age-gender-specic migration rates remain constant after 2005 at the level of our estimates
for the period 20002005. Second, once the migrants have moved to an urban area, their fertility and
mortality rates are assumed to be the same as those of urban residents.
Figure 2 shows the resulting projected population dynamics (solid lines). For comparison, we also
plot the natural population dynamics (i.e., the population model without migration [dotted lines]).
The rural population declines throughout the whole period. The urban population share increases
from 51% in 2011 to 81% in 2050 and to over 95% in 2100. In absolute terms, the urban population
increases from 470 million in 2000 to its long-run 1.1 billion level in 2050. Between 2050 and 2100
11Our method is related to Johnson (2003), who also exploits natural population growth rates. Our work is di¤erent
from Johnsons in three respects. First, his focus is on migration across provinces, whereas we estimate rural-urban
migration. Second, Johnson only estimates the total migration ow, whereas we obtain a full age-gender structure of
migration. Finally, our estimation takes care of measurement error in the census and survey (see discussion above),
which were not considered in previous studies.
12There are a number of inconsistencies across censuses and surveys. Notable examples include changes in the denition
of city population and urban area (see, e.g., Zhou and Ma, 2003; Duan and Sun, 2006). Such inconsistencies could
potentially bias our estimates. In particular, the denition of urban population in the 2005 survey is inconsistent with
that in the 2000 census. In the 2000 census, urban population refers to the resident population (changzhu renkou) of
the place of enumeration who had resided there for at least six months on census day. The minimum requirement was
removed in the 2005 survey. Therefore, relative to the 2005 survey denition, rural population tends to be over-counted
in the 2000 census. This tends to bias our NMF estimates downward.
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Figure 1: The gure shows rural-urban migration rates by age and gender as a share of each cohort. The
estimates are smoothed by ve-year moving averages.
there are two opposite forces that tend to stabilize the urban population: on the one hand, fertility
is below replacement in urban areas until 2100; on the other hand, there is still sizeable immigration
from rural areas.
Figure 3 plots the old-age dependency ratio (i.e., the number of retirees as percentage of individuals
in working age [18-60]) broken down by rural and urban areas (solid lines).13 We also plot, for contrast,
the old-age dependency ratio in the no migration counterfactual (dashed lines). Rural-urban migration
is very important for the projection. The projected urban old-age dependency ratio is 52% in 2050,
but it would be as high as 82% in the no migration counterfactual. This is an important statistic,
since the Chinese pension system only covers urban workers, so its sustainability hinges on the urban
old-age dependency ratio.
3.2 Calibration of wage and interest rate process
In this section, we calibrate the wage and interest rate process. We set the age-wage prole f$jg59j=23
equal to the one estimated by Song and Yang (2010) for Chinese urban workers. This implies an
average annual return to experience of 0.5%.
Urban hourly wages (holding human capital constant) are assumed to grow at 5.7% between 2000
13 In China, the o¢ cial retirement age is 55 for females and 60 for males. In the rest of the paper, we ignore this
distinction and assume that all individuals retire at age 60, anticipating that the age of retirement is likely to increase
in the near future. We also consider the e¤ect of changes in the retirement age.
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and 2013. This is consistent with the estimate of Ge and Yang (2014) for workers with only middle
school education. We base the future wage sequence which is essential for the quantitative results of
the paper on the (smoothed) forecast generated by a calibrated dynamic general-equilibrium model
with credit market imperfections close in spirit to SSZ. That model is laid out in detail in the appendix
(see, especially, gure III). This yields an annual growth of 4.9% for the period 2013-2031, followed
by an annual growth of 3.6% for 2031-2040. After 2040, wages grow at 2% per year, in line with wage
growth in the United States over the last century.
There has been substantial human capital accumulation in China over the last two decades. To
incorporate this aspect, we assume that each generation has a cohort-specic education level, which
is matched to the average years of education by cohort according to Barro and Lee (2013) see gure
IV in the appendix. The values for cohorts born after 1990 are extrapolated linearly, assuming that
the growth in the years of schooling ceases in year 2000 when it reaches an average of 12 years, which
is the current level for the US. We assume an annual return of 10% per year of education.14 Since
younger cohorts have more years of education, wage growth across cohorts will exceed that shown in
gure III (note though that the education level for an individual remains constant over each individual
work life).
The average wage growth in the economy compounds the productivity growth per e¢ ciency unit
of labor shown in gure III with the e¤ect of increasing educational attainment of the labor force. In
addition, there is a small e¤ect arising from changes in the age composition of workers: as we shall
see, the experience-wage prole is upward sloping, so an ageing workforce implies somewhat higher
average wages. When all these e¤ects are incorporated, the average annual growth rate in the period
2012-2050 is 4.8%. This is a conservative forecast in light of the wage growth the last two decades
(for example, Ge and Yang 2014, who estimate an annual 7.7% average wage growth in the period
1992-2007). However, our projected wage growth is in line with existing studies: Citibank forecasts
an annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 5% over the period 2010-2050 (Buiter and Rahbari 2011,
p.63). If the labor share remained constant, wage growth should remain aligned with GDP growth.
In section 5.1 we perform some sensitivity analysis of the speed of future wage growth.
The rate of return on capital is very large in China (Bai et al. 2006). However, these high rates
of return appear to have been inaccessible to the government and to the vast majority of workers
and retirees. Indeed, in addition to housing and consumer durables, bank deposits are the main asset
held by Chinese households in their portfolio. For example, in 2002 more than 68% of households
nancial assets were held in terms of bank deposits and bonds, and for the median decile of households
14Zhang et al. (2005) estimated returns to education in urban areas of six provinces from 1988 to 2001. The average
returns were 10.3% in 2001.
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this share is 75% (Chinese Household Income Project 2002, henceforth CHIP). Moreover, aggregate
household deposits in Chinese banks amounted to 76.6% of GDP in 2009 (China Statistical Yearbook
2010). High rates of return on capital do not appear to have been available to the government, either.
Its portfolio consists mainly of low-yield bonds denominated in foreign currency and equity in state-
owned enterprises, whose rate of return is lower than the rate of return to private rms (Dollar and
Wei 2007).
SSZ provides an explanation based on large credit market imperfections for why neither the
government nor the workers have access to the high rates of return of private rms. In this section,
we simply assume that the annual rate of return for private and government savings is R = 1:025. We
view a 2.5% annual return for the government savings as realistic. According to the National Council
for Social Security Fund, the average share of pension funds invested in stock markets was 19% in
2003-2011.15 Assuming an average 6% annual return on stock and a 1.75% return on the remaining
portfolio yields an average annual return of roughly 2.5%. This is also in line with the return on
best-practice Western pension funds. For instance, the Credit Suisse Swiss Pension Fund has achieved
a 2.25% annual rate of return between 2000-12. Concerning the return on private savings, a one-year
real deposit rate in Chinese banks the most typical saving instrument of private agents was 1.75%
during 1998-2005 (nominal deposit rate minus CPI ination). Given that some households have access
to savings instruments that yield higher returns, a 2.5% return seems a plausible assumption also for
private agents. Note that our economy is dynamically e¢ cient. Assuming R < 1:02 would imply that
the rate of return is lower than the long-run growth rate of the economy, implying dynamic ine¢ ciency.
In such a scenario, there would be no need for a pension reform due to a well-understood mechanism
(Abel et al. 1989).
In the appendix, we show that the wage rate dynamics in gure III and the assumed interest
rate path are a close approximation to the equilibrium outcome of a calibrated dynamic general
equilibrium model similar to SSZ, but augmented with the demographic model outlined above and a
pension system. In the general equilibrium model, the wage and interest rate sequences are su¢ cient
to compute the optimal decisions of workers and retirees about consumption and labor supply, as
well as the sequence of budget constraints faced by the government. The model in SSZ matches
well a number of salient macroeconomic trends for the recent period: output growth, wage growth,
return to capital, transition from state-owned to private rms, and foreign surplus accumulation. The
calibrated model is shown to yield plausible growth forecasts (although these are obviously subject
to great uncertainty). The growth rate of GDP per worker remains about 7.5% per year until 2020.
After 2020, productivity growth is forecasted to slow down. On average, China is expected to grow
15Source: http://www.ssf.gov.cn/xw/xw_gl/201205/t20120509_4619.html.
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at a rate of 6.5% between 2013 and 2040. The contribution of human capital is 0.8% per year, due to
the entry of more educated young cohorts in the labor force. In this scenario, the GDP per capita in
China will be 68% of the US level by 2040, remaining broadly stable thereafter.
3.3 Calibration of preferences and wealth distribution
One period is dened as a year and agents can live up to 100 years (J = 100). The demographic
process (mortality, migration, and fertility) is described in section 3.1. Agents become adult (i.e.,
economically active) at age JC = 22 and retire at age 60, which is the male retirement age in China
(so JW = 59).16 Hence, workers retire after 38 years of work. The discount factor is set to  = 1:0164
to capture the average urban household savings rate in China between 2000-2012 (i.e., 25%). This
is slightly higher than the value estimated by Hurd (1989) for the United States (i.e., 1.011). As a
robustness check, in section 5 we consider an alternative economy where  is lower for all people born
after 2013. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply in (1) is set to  = 0:5, in line with standard estimates
in labor economics (Keane 2011).
Finally, we set the initial distribution of household wealth to match the empirical distribution of
nancial wealth in 1995 in the CHIP.17 We exclude households with dependents over the age of 22,
though the results are not sensitive to controls on family structure. Given the 1995 wealth distribution,
we simulate the model over the 1995-2000 period, assuming an annual wage growth of 5.7%, excluding
human capital growth. The distribution of private wealth in 2000 is then obtained endogenously.
3.4 The current pension system
In this section, we lay out a set of taxes and pension entitlements that replicate the main features
of Chinas current pension system. A more comprehensive description of the Chinese system can be
found in the appendix.
The current Chinese system was originally introduced in 1986 and underwent a major reform in
1997. Before 1986, urban rms (which were almost entirely state owned at that time) were responsible
for paying pensions to their former employees. This enterprise-based system became untenable in
a market economy where rms can go bankrupt and workers can change jobs. The 1986 reform
introduced a dened benets system whose administration was assigned to municipalities. The new
16We have repeated the analysis assuming a retirement age of 57 for all workers. This is a weighted average of the
male and female retirement age, according to the current statutory rules. The results are reported in the appendix. The
scal imbalances of the system are larger. However, this does not change the main welfare results of the paper. We have
opted for using a retirement age of 60 as a benchmark because we believe the pension age is likely to increase as the
health of the Chinese population improves with economic progress.
17We exclude housing wealth in 1995 for two reasons. First, the data are highly uncertain. Second, the dynamics
of housing wealth distribution are driven by valuation e¤ects that reect, partly, increasing cost of housing services.
Including housing in the initial wealth distribution would have negligible consequences.
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system came under nancial distress, mostly due to rms evading their obligations to pay pension
contributions for their workers.
The subsequent 1997 reform reduced the replacement rates for future retirees and tried to enforce
social security contributions more strictly. The 1997 system has two tiers (plus a voluntary third tier).
The rst is a standard transfer-based basic pension system with resource pooling at the provincial
level. The second is an individual accounts system. However, as documented by Sin (2005, p.2),
the individual accounts are essentially empty accountssince most of the cash ow surplus has been
diverted to supplement the cash ow decits of the social pooling account.Due to its low capitalization,
the system can be viewed as broadly transfer-based, although it permits, as does the US Social Security
system, the accumulation of a trust fund to smooth the aging of the population. Since the individual
accounts are largely notional, we decided to ignore any distinction between the di¤erent pension pillars
in our analysis.
We model the pension system as a dened benets plan, subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint, (11). In the appendix, we discuss more explicitly how the institutional details are mapped
into the model. In line with the actual Chinese system, pensions are partly indexed to wage growth.
We approximate the benet rule by a linear combination of the average earnings of the beneciary at
the time of retirement and the current wage of workers, with weights 60% and 40%, respectively.18
More formally, the pension received at period t+ j by an agent who worked until period t+ JW (and
who became adult in period t) is:19
bt;t+j = qt+JW  (0:6  yt+JW + 0:4  yt+j 1) ; (9)
where j > JW ; and qt denotes the replacement rate in period t and yt is the average pre-tax labor
earnings for workers in period t:
yt 
wt
PJw
j=0 t j sj t j $j ht j;tPJw
j=0 t j sj
; (10)
where t jsj is the number of agents of cohort t  j (i.e., who became economically active in period
t  j) who have survived until period t. In line with the 1997 reform (see Sin 2005), we assume that
18The current Chinese system species a partial indexation based on the increase in (regional) nominal wages. Ac-
cording to Sin (2005), the level of such indexation has ranged historically between 40% and 60%. In her study, she
assumes a 60% indexation to nominal wage growth. Throughout our analysis, we abstract from ination and assume a
40% indexation to real wage growth. Over the twenty years following the 2013 reform, the two approaches yield the same
real pension growth as long as the annual ination rate is 2.65%. However, the two approaches yield di¤erent indexation
in the long run. Since any ination forecast over long horizons would be speculative, we prefer to assume a real wage
indexation, although this is not, strictly speaking, what the law says.
19Alternatively, the law of motion of pension benets can be expressed as bt;t+j =
bt+JW+1 (0:6 + 0:4 (yt+j 1=yt+JW )). Note that the denition of the replacement rate in this section is di¤erent
from that in the theoretical section 2.2. To avoid confusion we use a di¤erent notation (qk instead of k).
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pensioners retiring before 1997 continued to earn a 78% replacement rate throughout their retirement.
Moreover, those retiring between 1997 and 2011 are entitled to a 60% replacement rate. We assume
a constant social security tax () equal to 20%, in line with the empirical evidence.20
The current pension system of China covers only a fraction of the urban workers. The coverage
rate has grown from 45% in 2001 to 60% in 2011 (see China Statistical Yearbook 2012). In the baseline
model, we therefore assume a constant coverage rate of 60%. Workers who are not covered neither
pay the social security tax nor do they receive pensions.
The coverage rate of migrant workers is a key issue. Since we do not have direct information
about their coverage, we have simply assumed that rural immigrants get the same coverage rate as
urban workers. This seems a reasonable compromise between two considerations. On the one hand, the
coverage of migrant workers (especially low-skill non-hukou workers) is lower than that of non-migrant
urban residents; on the other hand, the total coverage has been growing since 1997.21
3.5 The government budget constraint
The pension system is said to be nancially balanced if, given an initial pension trust fund, A0, the
government intertemporal budget constraint holds, i.e.,
1X
t=0
R t
0@ JX
j=JW+1
t jsj bt j;t    t
JWX
j=0
t jsj $jt jwt ht j;t
1A  A0: (11)
We set the initial wealth, A0; equal to 1% of GDP. This matches the observation from the National
Statistics Bureau of China, according to which the pension trust fund amounted to 110 billion RMB
in 2001. In a previous version of this paper, we assumed that all initial government wealth (amounting
to 71% of GDP) can be committed to the pension system. In spite of the apparent large di¤erence
in initial wealth, the welfare e¤ects of alternative reforms are almost identical. The main di¤erence is
that the size of the scal adjustment needed to balance the budget is smaller when the pension system
has a larger initial fund.
3.6 The benchmark reform
Under our calibration of the model, the current pension system is not balanced. In other words, the
intertemporal budget constraint, (11), would not be satised if the current rules were to remain in
20The statutory contribution rate including both basic pensions and individual accounts is 28%. However, there is
evidence that a signicant share of the contributions is evaded, even for workers who formally participated in the system.
See the appendix for details.
21According to a recent document issued by the National Population and Family Planning Commission, 28% of migrant
workers are covered by the pension system (Table 5-1, 2010 Compilation of Research Findings on the National Floating
Population).
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Figure 4: Panel a shows the replacement rate qt for the benchmark reform (dashed line) versus the case when
the reform is delayed until 2052. Panel b shows tax revenue and expenditures, expressed as a share of aggregate
urban labor income (benchmark reform is dashed and the delay-until-2052 is solid). Panel c shows the evolution
of government debt, expressed as a share of aggregate urban labor income (the benchmark reform is dashed and
the delay-until-2052 is solid). Negative values indicate a surplus.
place forever. For the intertemporal budget constraint to hold, it is necessary either to reduce pension
benets or to increase contributions.
We construct a benchmark pension system to which we compare alternative reforms. To ensure
that this system is nancially viable, we assume that (i) the existing rules apply for all workers who
are already retired by 2013; (ii) the social security tax remains constant at  = 20% for all cohorts;
(iii) for workers retiring in 2013 or later, the replacement rate is amended and set permanently to a
new level q which is the highest constant level consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint,
(11). All households are assumed to anticipate that the benchmark reform will take place in 2013. We
refer to such a scenario as the benchmark reform.22
The benchmark reform entails a large reduction in the replacement rate, from 60% to 39.1%.
Namely, pensions must be cut by a third in order for the system to be nancially sustainable. Such
an adjustment is consistent with the existing estimates of the World Bank (see Sin, 2005, p.30).
Alternatively, if one were to keep the replacement rate constant at the initial 60% and to increase
taxes permanently so as to satisfy (11), then  should increase from 20% to 30.7% as of year 2013.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the replacement rate by cohort under the benchmark reform (panel
22We cannot take as our benchmark an unbalanced system that retains the current statutory rules forever, since it
would not make sense to compare its welfare properties with those associated with nancially sustainable reforms.
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a, dashed line). The replacement rate is 78% until 1997 and then falls to 60%. Under the benchmark
reform, it falls further to 39.1% in 2013, remaining constant thereafter. Panel b (dashed line) shows
that such a reform implies that the pension system runs a surplus until 2052. The government builds
up a government trust fund amounting to 210% of urban labor earnings by 2080 (panel c, dashed line).
The interests earned by the trust fund are used to nance the pension system decit after 2052.23
4 Alternative pension reforms
The theoretical analysis of section 2 shows that a social planner with a discount factor no higher than
(1 + g) =R (where, recall, g is the long run growth rate, and not the transitional wage growth in an
emerging economy) wants to redistribute in favor of the poorer earlier generations. The benchmark
reform, to the opposite, reduces current pension payments drastically in order to guarantee the nancial
sustainability of the pension in the long run.
In this section, we consider a set of alternative reforms that are also nancially sustainable, but
distribute the costs and benets of the adjustment in a di¤erent way from the benchmark reform. We
rst consider a set of theoretically motivated reforms along the lines of Proposition 1 and Corollary
2. This provides a useful benchmark quantifying how large welfare gain one could possibly achieve
through intergenerational redistribution. Then, we consider a set of policy reforms entailing less radical
changes of the existing rules. We view these experiments as useful because they correspond closely to
actual reforms that have been on the agenda of the policy debate in China and other countries. Each
alternative policy reform is introduced as a surprise. Namely, agents expect the benchmark reform,
but when 2013 arrives, unexpectedly, they learn that a di¤erent reform will take place. Subsequently,
perfect foresight is assumed. This assumption is not essential. The main results are qualitatively
identical and quantitatively very similar if one assumes that all reforms are perfectly anticipated in
year 2000.
4.1 The welfare criterion
Since the main goal of our analysis is to quantify the welfare implications of di¤erent reforms, we rst
introduce a welfare criterion analogous to that used in the theoretical analysis of section 2. To this end,
we measure, for each cohort, the equivalent consumption variation of each alternative reform relative
to the benchmark reform. Namely, we calculate what (percentage) change in lifetime consumption
23Note that in panel c the government net wealth (excluding debt) is falling sharply between 2000 and 2020 when
expressed as a share of urban earnings, even though the government is running a surplus. This is because urban earnings
are rising very rapidly due to both high wage growth and growth in the number of urban workers.
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would make agents in each cohort indi¤erent between the benchmark and the alternative reform.24
We then aggregate the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent cohorts by means of a utilitarian social welfare
function, where the weight of the future generation decays geometrically with a constant factor ,
as in section 2.2. The planners welfare function includes utilities of all agents alive in 2013 and the
objective function is evaluated in year 2013 (decisions made before 2013 are held constant). Then, the
equivalent variation is given by the value ! solving
1X
t=1935
t
t
JX
j=0
ju
 
(1 + !) cBENCHt;t+j ; h
BENCH
t;t+j

=
1X
t=1935
t
t
JX
j=0
ju
 
ct;t+j ; h

t;t+j

; (12)
where superscripts BENCH stand for the allocation in the benchmark reform and asterisks stand for
the allocation in the alternative reform.25
The planner experiences a welfare gain (loss) from the alternative allocation whenever ! > 0
(! < 0). We shall consider two particular values of the intergenerational discount factor, : First,
 = (1 + g) =R; which is the benchmark discount factor discussed in section 2.2 (see Proposition 1 and
Corollary 2) corresponding to a planner who prefers zero intergenerational redistribution in steady
state. Since in our calibration R = 1:025 and g = 0:02, such a planner has an annual discount rate
of 0:5%, a small number relative to standard calibrations.26 For this reason, we label the planner
with  = (1 + g) =R as the low-discount planner. As a robustness, following Nordhaus (2007), we
consider the case of  = R 1; namely, the planner discounts future utilities at the market interest
rate. We label such a planner as the high-discount planner. Relative to the low-discount benchmark,
the high-discount planner will demand more intergenerational redistribution in favor of the earlier
generations.
4.2 Theory-driven reforms
In this section, we compute the pension systems that implement the optimal policies of a low-discount
planner, and compare it with the benchmark reform. In addition to the unconstrained optimum
corresponding to Proposition 1 and labeled rst best, we consider (i) a policy where the pension
system is constrained to have non-negative pensions (labeled second best), and (ii) a more restrictive
environment in which the planner cannot increase the generosity of the pension system relative to the
24Note that we measure welfare e¤ects relative to increases in lifetime consumption even for people who are alive in
2012. This approach makes it easier to compare welfare e¤ects across generations.
25Note that we sum over agents alive or yet unborn in 2012. The oldest person alive became an adult in 1935, which
is why the summations over cohorts indexed by t start from 1935.
26Most macroeconomic studies assume discount rates in the range of 3-5%. In the debate on global warming, Nordhaus
suggests a 3% discount rate. Stern argues that this is ethically indefensible, and proposes to apply a 0.1% discount rate,
although many economists criticize this low rate for yielding counterfactual implications (for instance, governments
should accumulate assets rather than run debt). In this paper, we emphasize the quantitiative normative prediction of
the model when it is calibrated with the discount rates of 0.5% and 2.5%, which we regard as a conservative criterion.
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Figure 5: Panel a plots the sequence of cohort-specic replacement rates in the rst best reform (blue
solid line), second-best Ramsey reform with non-negative pensions (red dashed line), and Ramsey
reform where future replacement rates are bounded between zero and 60% (black dash-dotted line).
Panel b plots the corresponding consumption equivalent welfare gains for each cohort.
existing rules, namely, future replacement rates cannot exceed 60% (whereas the existing rules apply
for the agents already retired in 2013).
The two panels of gure 5 show, respectively, the sequence of cohort-specic replacement rates
in each of the three alternative reforms (upper panel), and the consumption equivalent welfare gain
for each cohort relative to the benchmark reform (lower panel). The panels display only generations
retiring after 2000.27
Consider the rst-best reform. The replacement rate is 230% for the cohort retiring in 2013.
Thereafter, it falls roughly linearly with the retirement date until it reaches -23.7% in 2075. There are
huge welfare gains for the transition generations exceeding 100% for those retiring between 2013 and
2033. The welfare gains fall over time and converge to -8.7% for the cohort retiring after 2075. All
generations retiring before 2062 gain from the reform. The welfare gain accruing to the low-discount
planner is 3.7% of consumption. In the case of the high-discount planner the gain is a staggering
41.7%.
The second best reform (subject to non-negative benets) yields a similar picture, although it
delivers slightly lower replacement rates for the transition generations, reaching zero for cohorts retiring
27The e¢ cient scheme involves large transfers to the generations already retired. For instance, those retiring in 1990
receive a replacement rate equal to 738% in the rst-best and to 698% in the second-best reform.
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after 2060. Taxes are zero for cohorts retiring before 2060, implying that the system builds up a debt
that is nanced by taxes on future generations. In steady state, the tax rate reaches 10.2%. The
welfare gain to the low-discount planner amounts to 3.6% of consumption.28
Finally, consider the constrained Ramsey allocation where the replacement rate must stay between
0 and 60%. In this case, the replacement rate is exactly 60% for all cohorts retiring until 2050. The
replacement rate falls and reaches zero in 2063. The steady-state taxes are lower (5.7%), because the
pension system is less generous with the transition generation and does not build up such a large debt
as in the previous case. The welfare gain to the low-discount planner is now substantially lower but
still signicant, being equal to 2% of consumption.
In conclusion, the quantitative normative analysis of this section has shown that even a planner
with a very high weight on future generations would use the pension system to implement a radical
intergenerational redistribution in spite of the averse demographics.
4.3 Policy-driven reforms
The benchmark reform achieves nancial balance through a draconian permanent reduction in pension
entitlements for all agents retiring after 2012. The analysis in section 4.2 shows that such adjustment
puts too large a burden on current generations relative to the normative benchmark.
The optimal pension policies discussed above are informative about how to improve on the bench-
mark reform, but arguably di¢ cult to implement. For instance, much of the current debate focuses
on whether reforms reducing the generosity of the system are urgent or can be postponed, and on
whether China should adopt rules that nudge the system in a more funded direction.
In this section, we consider a set of alternative sustainable reforms that speak more directly to
the policy debate, and that would alter less radically the existing rules. We consider three types of
reforms:
1. Delayed reform: we assume that the current rules are kept in place until period T (where
T > 2013), in the sense that the current replacement rate (qt = 60%) applies for those who
retire until period T; and taxes remain at 20%. Thereafter, the replacement rates are adjusted
permanently so as to satisfy (11). Note that, since the current system is not nancially bal-
anced, a delay requires a larger cut in replacement rates after T . Year T is chosen optimally
so as to maximize the planners welfare. This reform entails a key aspect of the optimal policy:
28We computed the rst- and second-best (and the corresponding benchmark) reforms under the alternative assumption
that A2013 = 0: The results are similar. The welfare gain of the rst best increases from 3.75% to 3.79%, while the second
best delivers smaller gains (3.67% vs. 3.64%). The planner delivers positive pensions until 2058, and the steady-state
tax rate reaches 10.2%.
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the replacement rate is decreasing over time, providing intergenerational distribution from the
future richer generations to the current poorer transition generation.
2. Fully-funded (FF) reform: we replace the current transfer-based system with a mandatory
saving-based scheme in 2013. In the FF reform scenario, dened benet transfers are abolished
in 2013. However, the government does not default on its outstanding liabilities (see footnote 30
for details). This reform entails an aspect of the optimal policy: it reduces the distortion caused
by the social security tax, although it does not provide any intergenerational redistribution.
3. Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) reform: we impose an annual balanced budget requirement to the pen-
sion system, keeping the social security tax at 20%. The benet rate is endogenously determined
by the tax revenue (which is, in turn, a¤ected by the demographic structure and endogenous
labor supply). Given the demographic transition and the initially high wage growth, this reform
yields high pensions to the earlier generations, and low pensions to the future ones in line with
the optimal policy.
4.3.1 Delayed reform
We start by computing the optimal delay of the benet cut. The optimal T for the low-discount
planner turns out to be 2050. Namely, the current replacement rate continues to apply for all workers
starting their employment before 2012, and the new lower replacement rate applies to workers starting
their employment earliest 2012. This means that lower pensions will start being paid in 2050, and by
2090 all retirees will earn the new lower replacement rate.
Due to the delay, the fund accumulates initially a lower surplus, forcing a larger reduction of the
replacement rate after 2050. Thus, relative to the benchmark reform, the delay shifts the burden of
the adjustment from the current (poorer) generations to (richer) future generations.
Figure 4 describes the welfare gains of delaying the reform until 2050. Panel a shows that the
post-reform replacement rate now falls to 36%, which is only 3.1 percentage points lower than the
replacement rate granted by the benchmark reform. Panel b shows that the pension expenditure is
higher than in the benchmark reform until 2075. Moreover, already in 2044 the system runs a decit.
Figure 6 shows the welfare gains of four reforms relative to the benchmark, broken down by the
year of retirement of each cohort. Consider the delayed reform experiment: There are large gains
for agents retiring between 2013 and 2049, on average over 15.9% of their lifetime consumption. The
main reason is that delaying the reform enables the transition generation to share the gains from high
wage growth after 2013, to which pension payments are (partially) indexed. All generations retiring
after 2050 lose, although their welfare losses are quantitatively small, being less than 1.7% of their
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Figure 6: The gure shows welfare gains of the policy-driven alternative reforms relative to the benchmark
reform for each cohort. For comparison, the welfare e¤ects of the rst-best policy is also plotted. The gains (!)
are expressed as percentage increases in consumption (see eq. 12).
lifetime consumption. Relative to the rst best, the delayed reform implies too little intergenerational
redistribution from future to current generations. Moreover, it entails labor supply distortions that are
absent in the rst-best reform. Yet, the low-discount planner enjoys a 0.9% welfare gain, corresponding
to roughly one quarter of the potential gain in the rst best, and half of the welfare gain obtained in
the planning allocation subject to the constraint that the replacement rate must lie between zero and
60%.
Figure 7 shows the welfare gains/losses of delaying the reform until year T . The gure displays
two curves: in the upper curve, we have the consumption equivalent variation of the high-discount
planner, while in the lower curve we have that of the low-discount planner. As discussed above, it is
optimal for the low-discount planner to delay the reform until 2050. The same delay would yield a
much larger welfare gain (6:4%) for the high-discount planner whose utility is increasing in the entire
range plotted by the gure.
4.3.2 Fully Funded Reform
Consider, next, switching to a FF system, i.e., a pure contribution-based pension system featuring
no intergenerational transfers, where agents are forced to save for their old age in a fund that has
access to the same rate of return as that of private savers. As long as agents are rational and have
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Figure 7: The gure shows the consumption equivalent gain/loss accruing to a high-discount planner (solid
line) and to a low-discount planner (dashed line) of delaying the reform until time T relative to the benchmark
reform. When ! > 0, the planner strictly prefers the delayed reform over the benchmark reform.
time-consistent preferences, and mandatory savings do not exceed the savings that agents would make
privately in the absence of a pension system, a FF system is equivalent to no pension system.29 As
discussed above, the government does not default on existing claims: all workers and retirees who
have contributed to the pension system are refunded the present value of the pension rights they have
accumulated.30 Since the social security tax is abolished, the existing liabilities are nanced by issuing
government debt. This debt is rolled over and serviced by a constant labor income tax (implying that
the outstanding debt level can uctuate over time). This scheme is similar to that adopted in the
1981 pension reform of Chile.
Figure 8 shows the outcome of this reform. The old system is terminated in 2013, but people with
accumulated pension rights are compensated as discussed above. To nance such a pension buy out
scheme, government debt must increase to over 200% of urban labor earnings in 2013. A permanent
0.6% annual tax is needed to service the debt. The government debt rst declines as a share of total
labor earnings due to high wage growth in that period, and then stabilizes at a level about 60% of
labor earnings around 2040. Future generations live in a low-tax society with no intergenerational
29Bohn (2011) shows that such equivalence breaks down in the presence of political or nancial constraints. These
aspects are ignored in our paper.
30 In particular, people who have already retired are given an asset worth the present value of the pensions according
to the old rules. Since there are perfect annuity markets, this is equivalent to the pre-reform scenario for those agents.
People who are still working and have contributed to the system are compensated in proportion to the number of years
of contributions.
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Figure 8: The gure shows outcomes for the fully funded reform (solid lines) versus the benchmark reform
(dashed lines). Panel a shows the replacement rates. Panel b shows the government debt as a share of aggregate
urban labor income.
transfers.
As shown in gure 6, the distributional e¤ects are opposite to those of the delayed reforms. The
cohorts retiring between 2013 and 2059 are harmed by the FF reform relative to the benchmark. There
is no e¤ect on earlier generations, since those are fully compensated by assumption. The losses are
also modest for cohorts retiring soon after 2013, since these have earned almost full pension rights by
2013. However, the losses increase for later cohorts and become as large as 10.6% for those retiring in
2030-2035. For such cohorts, the system based on intergenerational transfer is attractive, since wage
growth is high during their retirement age (implying fast-growing pensions), whereas the returns on
savings are low. Losses fade away for cohorts retiring after 2050 and turn into gains for those retiring
after 2059. However, the long-run gains are modest.
The FF reform yields a 0.2% consumption equivalent gain for the low-discount planner. This
small gain arises from two opposite e¤ects: on the one hand, the FF reform reduces the labor supply
distortion, due to the lower taxes; on the other hand, it does worse than the benchmark reform in
terms of the intergenerational redistribution desired by the planner. As the high-discount planner
values intergenerational redistribution more than the low-discount planner, the former strictly prefers
the benchmark over the FF reform, with a consumption equivalent discounted loss of 3.3%.
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4.3.3 Pay-as-you-go reform
The delayed reform experiment was restricted by design to yield a two-tier replacement rate (pre-
and post-reform) with a maximum replacement rate of 60% for the generations before the reform. In
contrast, the optimal policy features a declining benet sequence with very high replacement rates for
the initial generations (particularly, for those already retired). In an aging economy, a pure PAYGO
system would precisely yield a smooth decline in replacement rates. However, relative to the optimal
policy, a PAYGO entails tax distortions that the planner dislikes, as we showed.
In this section, we consider the e¤ect of switching to a PAYGO. We maintain the contribution rate
xed at  = 20% and assume that the benets equal the total contributions in each year. Therefore,
the pension benets bt in period t are endogenously determined by the following formula:31
bt =

PJW
j=0 t jsj $jt jwt ht j;tPJ
j=JW+1
t jsj
:
Figure 9 shows the outcome of this reform. Panel a reports the pension benets as a fraction of
the average earnings by year. Note that this notion of replacement rate is di¤erent from that used in
the previous experiments (panel a of gures 4 and 8); there the replacement rate was cohort specic
and was computed according to equation (9) by the year of retirement of each cohort. Until 2053, the
PAYGO reform implies larger average pensions than does the benchmark reform.
Panel b shows the lifetime pension as a share of the average wage in the year of retirement, by
cohort. This is also larger than in the benchmark reform until the cohort retiring in 2045. We should
note that, contrary to the previous experiments which were neutral vis-à-vis cohorts retiring before
2013, here even earlier cohorts benet from the PAYGO reform, since the favorable demographic
balance yields higher pensions than what they were promised. This can be seen in panel b of gure 9
and gure 6. Welfare gains are very pronounced for all cohorts retiring before 2045, especially so for
those retiring right after 2013, who would su¤er a signicant pension cut in the benchmark reform.
These cohorts retire in times when the old-age dependency ratio is still very low, so benets are large.
Generations retiring after 2045 instead lose.
Due to the strong redistribution in favor of poorer early generations, in spite of the tax distortion,
the utilitarian welfare is signicantly higher under the PAYGO reform than in the benchmark reform,
for both a high- and low-discount planner. The consumption equivalent gains relative to the benchmark
reform are, respectively, 12.4% and 1.6% for urban workers. These gains are larger than under all
alternative reforms (including delayed and FF reform).
31Note that the pension system has accumulated some wealth before 2012. We assume that this wealth is rebated to
the workers in a similar fashion as the implicit burden of debt was shared in the fully funded experiment. In particular,
the government introduces a permanent reduction  in the labor income tax, in such a way that the present value of this
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Figure 9: Panel a shows the average pension payments in year t as a share of average wages in year t for
the PAYGO (solid) and the benchmark reform (dashed line). Panel b shows the ratio of the lifetime pensions
(discounted to the year of retirement) to the average labor earnings just before retirement for each cohort.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we study how the main results of the previous section depend on structural features
of the model economy: wage growth, population dynamics, and interest rate. We also show that
the results are robust to modeling the pension system as comprising two separate budgets for the
dened benet and individual account component. We refer to the calibration of the model used in
the previous section as the baseline economy. Table 1 summarizes the results discussed throughout
this section. Each column reports the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent reforms accruing to the high- and
low-discount planner relative to a particular environment.
5.1 Lower wage growth
In the analysis above, Chinese wages grow fast over the next twenty-ve years, and converge to 54%
of the US level by 2040. Thereafter, the gap remains constant. In the theoretical analysis of section
2, the sequence of fast convergence followed by a growth slowdown is the key source for the welfare
gain of intergenerational redistribution. In this section, we consider two alternative wage scenarios;
(1) zero growth over and above the 2% long-run growth so the long-run wages are lower than in the
baseline scenario (no convergence), and (2) slower wage growth, i.e., a slower convergence to the same
tax subsidy equals the 2012 accumulated pension funds. In our calibration, we obtain  = 0:59%:
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Delayed until 2050 Delayed until 2100 Fully Funded PAYGO
Planners discount rate high low high low high low high low
Baseline parameterization 6.4% 0.9% 8.9% 0.6% -3.3% 0.2% 12.4% 1.6%
Slow wage convergence 6.4% 1.0% 9.0% 0.7% -3.6% 0.1% 12.3% 1.7%
Low wage growth 3.3% -0.1% 5.6% -0.4% -0.6% 0.8% 5.0% -0.1%
Low fertility 8.5% 3.2% 11.2% 0.5% -2.6% -0.5% 14.9% 4.8%
Slow migration 6.5% 0.9% 8.7% 0.6% -3.3% 0.2% 11.5% 1.6%
High interest rate 3.2% -0.1% 4.9% -0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 9.5% -0.1%
Two separate pillars 6.2% 1.0% 7.8% 0.8% -2.2% -0.1% 7.6% 1.2%
Table 1: The table summarizes the welfare e¤ects (measured in terms of compensated variation in
consumption for the high- and low-discount rate planners, respectively) of alternative pension reforms
relative to the benchmark 2013 reform.
wage level as in the baseline scenario. As we shall see, the welfare implications of pension reforms
di¤er sharply across these two alternative wage growth scenarios.
5.1.1 Scenario 1: Low wage growth (no convergence)
In no convergence scenario, we assume wage growth to be constant and equal to 2% after 2013. In
this case, the benchmark reform implies a replacement rate of 40.4%.32
The welfare e¤ects of the alternative reforms (assuming the low wage growth) are displayed in the
rst row of panels in gure 10 and aggregated in the second row of table 1. In general, the welfare gains
of the earlier generations relative to the benchmark 2013 reform are signicantly smaller than in the
baseline wage growth economy. For instance, if the reform is delayed until 2050 (yielding a replacement
rate of 37%) the cohorts retiring between 2013 and 2049 experience a welfare gain ranging between
8.3% and 9.8%. The cost imposed on future generations remains similar in magnitude to that of the
baseline economy. For the low-discount planner, there is a tiny loss from delaying. The high-discount
planner continues to enjoy a positive welfare gain (3.3%), albeit signicantly lower than in the baseline
economy. This is not surprising, since the high-discount planner wants a declining replacement rate
sequence even in steady state (see Proposition 1).
As in the baseline case, the FF alternative reform harms earlier cohorts, whereas it benets all
cohorts retiring after 2046. However, the relative losses of the earlier cohorts are signicantly smaller
than in the baseline economy. For instance, the cohort that is most negatively a¤ected by the FF
reform su¤ers a loss of 3.9% in the low wage growth economy, compared to a 10.7% loss in the baseline
economy. The low-discount planner would now prefer the FF reform over any of the alternatives 
32Note that in the low wage growth economy, the present value of the pension payments is lower than in the baseline
economy, since pensions are partially indexed to the wage growth. Thus, pensions are actually lower, in spite of the
slightly higher replacement rate.
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Figure 10: The gure shows consumption equivalent gains/losses accruing to di¤erent cohorts in three alter-
native scenarios. The top panels refer to the slow wage converge scenario of section 5.1.2. The middle panels
refer to the low wage growth (no convergence) scenario of section 5.1.1. The bottom panels refer to the low
fertility scenario of section 5.2. In each panel, the dashed lines refer to the welfare gains under the benchmark
calibration (see section 4). The left-hand panels show the consumption equivalent gains/losses associated with
delaying the reform until 2052 (solid lines). The center panels show the consumption equivalent gains/losses
associated with a fully funded reform (solid lines). The right-hand panels show the consumption equivalent
gains/losses associated with a PAYGO reform (solid lines).
the welfare gain arising from the reduction in the tax wedge. Finally, the large welfare gains from
the PAYGO alternative reform by and large vanish. The low-discount planner would now prefer the
benchmark reform to the PAYGO reform.
5.1.2 Scenario 2: Slower convergence
In this scenario, we assume an annual wage growth of 4% until 2050, and 2% thereafter. From 2050
and onward, the wage gap between China and the US is 54%, as in the baseline scenario.
The results of this experiment are quantitatively similar to the baseline case. Delaying the re-
form until 2050 requires lowering the replacement rate (relative to the benchmark 2013 reform) by 3
percentage points, as in the baseline wage growth scenario. The mid-left panel of gure 10 plots the
welfare gains/losses of generations retiring between 2000 and 2110 in the case of a delay of the reform
until 2050. The continuous line refers to the slow wage growth scenario, whereas the dashed line refers
to the baseline wage growth scenario, for comparison. From the social planners standpoint, the net
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e¤ect of delaying the reform is about the same: delaying the reform until 2050 delivers a consumption-
equivalent welfare gain to the low (high) discount planner of 1.0% (6.4%), approximately the same as
in the baseline scenario (see the third row of table 1).33
The distribution of welfare gains in the FF and PAYGO experiments are essentially the same
as in the baseline economy (see mid-center and mid-right panels of gure 10). The PAYGO reform
continues to dominate over all alternative options: a gain of 1.7% (12.3%) accrues the low (high)
discount planner, compared to 1.6% (12.4%) in the baseline case.
5.1.3 Summary
In summary, wage convergence, a typical feature of emerging economies, is critical for the welfare gains
of delaying a reform (or of switching to PAYGO as opposed to a FF system). It is the convergence per
se rather than its speed that matters. We have considered two scenarios in which the average Chinese
wage converges to 54% of the US level (an assumption that we regard as realistic, if conservative).
In one case, convergence ends in 2040, in another it takes until 2050. The welfare implications of
the alternative pension reforms considered are essentially identical. In contrast, the results are very
di¤erent, even reversed, if we shut down the process of wage convergence. The comparison with a
constant 2% wage growth scenario is especially revealing, since it is consistent with the standard
assumption for pension analyses of developed economies.
5.2 Lower fertility
Our forecasts are based on the assumption that the TFR will increase to 1.8 already in 2013. In
this section, we consider an alternative lower fertility scenario along the lines of scenario 1 in Zeng
(2007). In this case, the rural and urban TFRs are assumed to be 1.98 and 1.2 forever, implying an
ever-shrinking total population. We view this as a lower bound to reasonable fertility forecasts. Next,
we consider the welfare e¤ects of the two alternative reforms. The three bottom panels of gure 10
show the age distribution of the welfare e¤ects and the gains are aggregated in the fourth row of table
1.
Under this low-fertility scenario, the benchmark reform requires an even more draconian adjust-
ment. The replacement rate must be set equal to 33.4% as of 2013. Delaying the reform is now
substantially more costly. A reform in 2050 requires a replacement rate of 20.8%. The trade-o¤
between current and future generations becomes sharper than in the baseline economy. On the one
33For simplicity, we report the welfare gain of delaying the reform until the same year as was optimal in the baseline
scenario, i.e., T = 2050. However, with slower convergence the low-discount planner would nd it optimal to delay the
reform until 2052. The reason is that there are now more poor generations, and thus the planner would want to retain
for longer the old generous replacement rate.
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hand, there are larger gains for the cohorts retiring between 2013 and 2050 relative to the benchmark
reform. On the other hand, the delay is more costly for the future generations. Aggregating gains
and losses yields a gain for the low-discount planner of 3.2%, signicantly larger than in the baseline
economy. The FF reform exhibits larger losses than in the baseline model (even the low-discount
planner prefers the benchmark to a FF reform). Moreover, the PAYGO reform yields larger gains
than in the benchmark reform.
The reason for the larger gains from delaying the reform or switching to PAYGO is related to the
fact that an economy with a low population growth is intrinsically poorer which is reected in a lower
replacement rate in the benchmark case. Thus, sticking to the current rule (60% replacement rate for
the earlier generations) implies more intergenerational redistribution than in the baseline economy.
Since we have shown that the planner would like substantially larger replacement rates than 60%
for the transition generation (see gure 5), the low population growth relaxes the constraint for the
planner. Thus the planner has a stronger preference for the delayed reform than in the richer baseline
economy. A similar argument applies to the PAYGO reform.
5.3 Slower migration
In the baseline case, the future age-specic migration rates are assumed to be time invariant. One
might nd it plausible that as urbanization proceeds, the migration rates will dwindle. We considered
the following alternative experiment: we scaled down all migration rates to 55.2% of the baseline rates.
This implies that the urban share of the total population is 67.6% in 2050, compared to 80.9% in the
baseline economy. We view this as a lower bound to a realistic description of the migration process.
The results are quantitatively similar. In fact, the adjustment of the replacement rate required to
achieve nancial sustainability is slightly lower (a di¤erence at the second digit) under slow migration
than in the baseline scenario. Intuitively, in the initial years (i.e., until 2038) the migration ow
is larger in the baseline scenario. However, after 2039 the slow migration scenario implies a larger
migration ow (i.e., migrants per year), since more people are left in the rural areas and fertility
remains high there (see gure VIII in the appendix). Thus, in the slow migration scenario more
migrants enter the urban sector when wages are already high and wages and pensions grow slowly.
This makes for a larger contribution to the pension system than does a massive migration in the
rst period, when productivity is still low and wage and pension growth are higher. The comparison
between alternative reforms yields similar results to the baseline model (see table 1).
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5.4 High interest rate
In the macroeconomic literature on pension reforms in developed economies, it is common to assume
that the return on the assets owned by the pension fund is equal to the marginal return to capital.
In this paper, we have calibrated the return on assets to 2.5%. However, the empirical rate of return
on capital in China has been argued to be much higher (see discussion above). To get a sense of the
role of this assumption, we now consider a scenario in which the interest rate is much higher equal
to 6%  between 2013 and 2050.34
There are two main di¤erences between the scenarios with lower and higher interest rates. First,
delaying the reform yields much smaller gains for the transitional generations, and in fact the low-
discount planner is essentially indi¤erent between the benchmark reform and a delay until 2050.
Second, the FF reform entails larger gains for the future generations and smaller losses for the current
generations relative to the baseline calibration. As should be expected, when the interest rate is
signicantly higher than the average growth rate, the PAYGO system becomes less appealing, because
the gains to current generations are smaller. In particular, the low-discount planner prefers the FF to
the PAYGO reform.
5.5 A two-pillar system with perfect separation
In the analysis so far we have ignored an important institutional feature of the Chinese pension sys-
tem, namely, the distinction (introduced with the 1997 reform) between a dened benet (rst pillar)
component granting a 35% replacement rate and an individual account (second pillar) component
estimated to pay an average 24.3% replacement rate (see Hu et al. 2007). As discussed above, our
choice is motivated by the observation that the second pillar is largely notional, due to its under-
capitalization. Although the two pillars are formally managed by di¤erent authorities, it is unclear
to what extent the commitment not to engage in cross-subsidization is credible. This motivates our
choice to treat the two pillars as being part of the same fungible pool of resources in the main analysis
above. In this section, we explore the alternative assumption that individual accounts belong to a
totally separate budget and cannot be reneged upon. Thus, a sustainable reform can only pertain to
the rst pillar.
An important feature that must be taken into account is that the 1997 reform makes provisions
for generations that have not accumulated signicant individual accounts. For instance, a worker
retiring in the year 2000 would only have had three years to build up her account at the time of the
reform. Therefore, in order to capture the formal rules of the system, one must take into account that
the move towards a two-pillar system is gradual and implies no default vis-a-vis the generations that
34See Song et al. (2014) for an extensive discussion of the interest rate policy and capital market constraints in China.
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contributed to the pre-reform system. More specically, we assume that the new two-pillar system
applies in its integrity to the generations entering the labor force after 1997, while the application
is gradual for earlier generations. Although the details of the actual implementation are somewhat
opaque, we assume a linearly declining rst-pillar replacement rate from 78% in 1996 to 35% in 2035.
Recall that in our model individual accounts can be ignored as they are equivalent to personal savings.
We set the post-reform social security tax rate pertaining to the rst pillar to 12%. This takes into
account the high evasion rates that are common in China.35 This contribution rate starts applying
already in 1998 and, as before, is kept constant over time and across experiments.
As in the baseline economy, the system based on the 1997 rules is not sustainable. In particular,
while individual accounts are sustainable by construction, the rst pillar is severely underfunded.
In line with the analysis in section 3, we set as our benchmark a draconian reform that reduces
the replacement rate suddenly and permanently to a new constant level in 2013 so as to meet the
intertemporal budget constraint. The new replacement rate is in this case 23.2%. Note that this level
is substantially lower than the statutory 35% replacement rate. Moreover, it applies right away to all
generations retiring from 2013 and onwards.
We contrast the benchmark reform to a delayed reform in which the statutory rules continue
to apply until 2049. Namely, the replacement rate declines gradually to 35% in 2035, and remains
constant until 2049 when the sustainable reform is applied. The replacement rate that applies from
2050 and onwards is 21%, more than two percentage points less than in the draconian reform.
Panel a of gure 11 displays the replacement rate by the year of retirement in the benchmark
(dotted line) and delayed (solid line) reform. Panel b of gure 11 shows the associated welfare gains
broken down by cohorts. Relative to the baseline economy of section 2 which does not distinguish
between the two pillars, there are now larger gains for the cohorts retiring earlier than 2028, and
smaller (but still substantial) gains for cohorts retiring 2028-2049. The reason is that the statutory
replacement rate in the two pillar system declines gradually, so the older cohorts have more to gain from
the delay than in the baseline economy. The consumption equivalent gain for the low-discount planner
is now marginally larger. The comparison between the benchmark reform and other alternatives (fully-
funded, PAYGO) yield similar results to the baseline economy: the PAYGO yields a 1.2% welfare gain,
whereas the FF reform is approximately equivalent to the benchmark draconian reform (see the last
row of table 1).
We conclude that our results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to modelling the Chinese
35Recall that the statutory contribution rates for the rst and second pillars are 20% and 8%, respectively. We
assume there is tax evasion only for the rst pillar. The assumption is based on the substitutability between wages and
contributions to the second pillar under a fully consolidated individual account. This implies an actual contribution rate
of 12% to the rst pillar.
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pension system more closely to its statutory rules, assuming full commitment on individual accounts.
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Figure 11: Panel a shows the replacement rate qt for the two-pillar benchmark reform (dashed line)
versus the case when the reform of the two-pillar system is delayed until 2050 (solid line). Panel
b shows the welfare gains of delaying the reform of the two-pillar system relative to the two-pillar
benchmark reform for each cohort (solid line). It also reports, for comparison, the welfare gain of
delaying the reform in the baseline economy (dashed line, cf. gure 4). The gains (!) are expressed
as percentage increases in consumption (see eq. 12).
6 Rural Pension
The vast majority of people living in rural areas are not covered by the current Chinese pension. In
accordance with this fact, we have so far maintained the assumption that only urban workers are part
of the pension system. In this section, to contribute to the lively policy debate on this issue, we study
the welfare implications of extending the system to rural workers.
Although a rural and an urban pension system could in principle be separate programs, we assume
here that there is a consolidated intertemporal budget constraint, namely, the government can transfer
funds across the rural and urban budgets. This is consistent with the observation that the modest
rural pension system that China is currently introducing is heavily underfunded, suggesting that
the government implicitly anticipates a resource transfer from urban to rural areas. The modied
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consolidated government budget constraint then becomes
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where superscripts r denote variables pertaining to the rural areas, whereas urban variables are dened,
as above, without any superscript.
We assume the rural wage rate to be 54% of the urban wage in 2000, consistent with the empirical
evidence from the China Health and Nutrition Survey. The annual rural wage growth is assumed to
be on average 4.1% between 2000-2024, and 2% thereafter (see gure VI in the appendix).
We consider two experiments. In the rst (low-scale reform), we introduce a rural pension system
with rules that are di¤erent from those applying to urban areas in 2013. This experiment mimics the
rules of the new old-age programs that the Chinese government is currently introducing for rural areas
(see appendix). Based on the current policies, we set the rural replacement rate (qrt ) and contribution
rate ( rt ) to 20% and 6%, respectively. These rates are assumed to remain constant forever. Moreover,
we assume that all rural inhabitants older than retirement age in 2013 are eligible for this pension.
Introducing such a scheme in 2013 would worsen the scal imbalance. Restoring the scal balance
through a reform in 2013 requires the replacement rate of urban workers to be cut to qt = 37:8%, i.e.,
1.3 percentage points lower than in the benchmark reform without rural pensions. Hence, the rural
pension implies a net transfer from urban to rural inhabitants.
A low-discount planner who only cares for urban households participating in the pension system
would incur a welfare loss of less than 0.7% from expanding the pension system to rural inhabitants.
In contrast, a low-discount planner who only cares for rural households would incur a welfare gain of
12%. When weighting rural and urban households by their respective population shares, one obtains
an aggregate welfare gain of 1.7% relative to the benchmark reform.
The second experiment (drastic reform) consists of turning the Chinese pension system into a
universal system, pooling all Chinese workers and retirees  in both rural and urban areas  into a
system with common rules. As of 2013, all workers contribute 20% of their wage. In addition, the
system bails out all workers who did not contribute to the system in the past. Namely, all workers
are paid benets according to the new rule even though they had not made any contribution in
the past. Although rural and urban retirees have the same replacement rate, pension benets are
proportional to the group-specic wages (i.e., rural [urban] wages for rural [urban] workers). As in the
benchmark reform above, the replacement rate is adjusted in 2013 so as to satisfy the intertemporal
budget constraint of the universal pension system. Although we ignore issues with the political and
administrative feasibility of such a radical reform, this experiment provides us with an interesting
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upper bound of the e¤ect of a universal system.
The additional scal imbalance from turning the system into a universal one is surprisingly small:
the replacement rate must be reduced to qt = 38% from 2013 onward, relative to 39:1% in the
benchmark reform. The welfare loss for urban workers participating in the system is very limited
(marginally lower than in the low-scale reform). In contrast, there are sizable welfare gains for rural
workers and for the urban workers who are not currently participating in the system (on average,
14.1% and 0.8%, respectively, if evaluated by a low-discount planner).
To understand why this reform can give so large gains with such a modest additional scal burden,
it is important to emphasize that (i) the earnings of rural workers are on average much lower than
those of urban workers; and (ii) the rural population is declining rapidly over time. Both factors make
pension transfers to the rural sector relatively inexpensive. It is important to note that our calculations
ignore any cost of administering and enforcing the system. In particular, the benet would decrease
if the enforcement of the social security tax in rural areas proves to be more di¢ cult than in urban
areas.
7 Conclusions
Pension systems have been a key instrument for sharing high growth across generations in Western
economies after World War II and could potentially play the same role in emerging countries. However,
the prospect of an adverse demographic transition threatens the scal sustainability of non-funded
pension systems. In this paper, we analyze the positive and normative e¤ects of alternative pension
reforms with the aid of a dynamic model calibrated to China.
A number of studies before us argue that China must reform its pension system to achieve long-run
balance (see, e.g., Sin 2005, Dunaway and Arora 2007, Salditt et al. 2007, and Lu 2011). Our analysis
concurs with this view, but shows that rushing into a draconian reform would have large unequalizing
e¤ects: it would harm current generations and only mildly benet future generations. In a fast-growing
society like China, this would imply dispensing with a powerful institution redistributing resources
from richer future generations to poorer current ones. Even a planner with an annual discount rate as
low as 0.5% would prefer an unfunded pay-as-you-go system to both an immediate sustainable reform
and to a reform that pre-funds the pension system.
The results are subject to some caveats. First, nancial sustainability could be aided by increasing
the retirement age. In the working paper version, we show that increasing retirement age by six years
would restore nancial sustainability. However, this would not alter the desire to use the pension
system to achieve intergenerational redistribution in favor of the earlier generations. Second, we do
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not consider the e¤ects of pension reforms on future fertility (see Courdacier et al. 2013). Finally, we
abstract from the crowding out e¤ect of public pensions on within-family old-age care. We believe that
extending the analysis in these directions would not overturn our main insights. Our results obtain
in a standard OLG model that predicts that, in a mature economy with steady wage growth and
perfect capital markets, a fully funded system outperforms an unfunded PAYGO system. This sharp
contrast illustrates the general principle that mechanically transposing policy advice from mature to
developing or emerging economies may be misleading (see Acemoglu et al. 2006).
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A Technical analysis and extensions related to section 2
We now restate and prove Proposition 1, which characterizes the optimal allocation and the associated
pension policy. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we abstract from a hump-shaped age-
prole of wages (so the age prole is at and j = 1), human capital deepening over time (so $j = 1),
and mortality before J (so sj = 1 and all agents survive until age J , at which point they die for sure).
Proposition 1 (restated) Consider an economy where wages grow at the constant rate ~g during
the transition and g < ~g in steady state, i.e., gt = ~g for t 2 f0; 1; ::; Tg; and gt = g for t > T . The size
of the cohort born in period t is denoted t and sj denotes the unconditional probability of surviving
until age j. Agents live for J  2 periods and retire after JW < J periods. The optimal allocation
(rst best) solves the following planning program:36
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where ct;j and ht;j are consumption and labor supply of an individual of age j born at date t. Then,
the rst-best allocation is given by:
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36We ignore for simplicity the generations born before t = 0:
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where  is a decreasing function of A0:
Consider a cohort born at k; and let Wk =
PJw
j=0 (1   t;j)wk+jhk;jR j denote the present value of
expected (after-tax) labor income for a representative household, where hk;j is the average labor supply
of workers of cohort k with experience j. Denote by bk;j the pension paid to a retiree of cohort k and
age j. Dene cohort ks pension replacement rate k as the present value of pensions as a share of
Wk, i.e., k =
PJ
j=Jw+1
bk;jR
 j

=Wk. The rst-best allocation can be implemented by a Ramsey
sequence of cohort-specic taxes and pension replacement rates. These sequences are characterized as
follows:
(1) Taxes are zero in all periods,  t;j = 0 for all t and j;
(2) The pension replacement sequence satises
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is a non-decreasing function of the birth date t. Finally 0 is given by
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Proof. The characterization of the rst-best allocation, (5)(7) follows from the problem (14)-(4)
using standard methods. Consider, next, the Ramsey policy. Since  t;j = 0; the intratemporal rst-
order condition implies equation (7). The Euler equation implies that ct;j = (R)
j ct;0 as in (6). Next,
plugging in (6) and (7) into the budget constraint, and recalling that t is proportional to the present
value of earnings, yields
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Solving for ct;0 yields
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Lagging the expression, taking the ratio of ct+1;0=ct; and using (8)-(16), yields
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We now show that replacing F (t) by its expression in (16) yields ct+1;0=ct;0 = R, which is consistent
with the optimality condition (5).
Suppose, rst, that t > T: Then, replacing F (t) by its expression in (16) and simplifying terms
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which is consistent with (5).
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which is again consistent with (5).
Suppose, nally, that t  T   Jw: Then, proceeding as above,
ct+1;0
ct;0
1+
=

R
1 + g
1 + g
1 + ~g
1+
 1 (1 + ~g)1+ = (R)1+ ;
which is again consistent with (5).
Finally, we show that the individual optimization yields c0;0 =  1 proving that the entire Ramsey
sequence satises the rst-best condition (5). To this aim, note that
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Collecting terms and replacing 0 by (17) yields c00 = 
 1:
Corollary 1 Suppose  = (1 + g) =R: Then, the optimal pension benet sequence is strictly decreas-
ing for all transition generations, t  T; and constant for all generations born after the end of the
transition, t = L for all t > T:
1 + ~t+1
1 + ~t
=

1 + g
1 + ~g
1+
:
Proof. The proof follows from (8)-(16), recalling that ~g > g:
Corollary 2 Consider the environment of Proposition 1. Suppose  = (1 + g) =R, A0  0, and that
the Ramsey implementation is subject to the additional constraint that pensions are non-negative, i.e.,
t  0 for all t: The second-best Ramsey allocation has the following characterization: Either the
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constraint t  0 is never binding (A0 is very large), and the rst best can be implemented by the
policy described in Proposition 1, or there exists T^ <1 such that:
(1) If t < T^ ; then, up to an increase in  (implying a lower c0;0), the Ramsey policy sequence is
identical to the unconstrained policy sequence that implements rst best, i.e., taxes are zero in all
periods,  t;j = 0 for all t and j; and pensions are given by (8) (17);
(2) If t  T^ ; then, t = 0 and taxes are constant and positive for the cohort,  t;j =  t > 0.
Proof. The second-best Ramsey problem can be formulated as follows
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subject to the non-negative-pension constraint t  0, to the resource constraint
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and to the constraint that households optimize given the scal policy sequence
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We use the households optimal decisions substitute out the labor supply from the planner constraints.
Moreover, the Euler equation of consumers allows us to express the problem as a function of ct;0 rather
that of the entire consumption sequence of each cohort. This leaves only the resource constraint and
the non-negative pension constraint, expressed in terms of tax rates and the sequence fct;0g1t=0. Using
these constraints, we can express the second-best problem in terms of the following Lagrangian:
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where t  0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint t  0, and  > 0 is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint.
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The FOCs with respect to ct;0 and 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 t;j)
 
wt+j
(R)j
!1+
(ct;0)
 (1+) +
X
j
j
1A = 0; (19)
@L
@ t;j
= t
0@j (1   t;j) wt+j
(R)j
!1+
(ct;0)
 (1+) + t
0@(1 + )j (1   t;j) wt+j
(R)j
!1+
(ct;0)
 
1A1A 

0@ 1
Rt
j (1   t;j) 1
 
wt+j
(R)j
!1+
(ct;0)
 
1A = 0: (20)
Consider, next, two separate cases:
1. t = 0, i.e., the constraint t  0 is slack. In this case, the problem is identical to the imple-
mentation of the rst best in Proposition 1, up to an increase in the value of . In particular,
letting  t;j =  t = 0 implies that ct;0 =  1 (R)t (see equation (5)) and ht;j =

wt+j
ct;j

; for
j 2 f0; 1; :::; Jwg (see equation (7)). Since  is larger, consumption is lower and labor supply is
higher. Moreover, if the constraint is slack at t > 0; it must also be slack for all k  t: To see
why, note that the pension sequence t given by (8)-(17) is non-increasing, so t > 0 (and, thus,
t = 0) implies k > 0 (thus, again, k = 0) for all k < t.
2. t > 0, i.e., the constraint that pensions cannot be negative is binding. Thus, t = 0 and the
individual budget constraint yields:
X
jct;0 =
JwX
j (1   t;j)1+
 
wt+j
(R)j
!1+
(ct;0)
  (21)
Combining (19)-(20) yields:
t
0@X
j
j
1
ct;0
+ t
0@Xj   JwXj (1   t;j)1+ wt+j
(R)j
!1+
c  1t;0
1A1A  
0@ 1
Rt
X
j
j
1A = 0:
Substituting into this expression the budget constraint, (21), implies:
t
t
X
j
j
1
ct;0
   t
Rt
X
j
j = 0)
ct;0 = 
 1 (R)t :
Finally, substituting this condition into (20), and solving for  t; after rearranging terms, yields:
 t;j =  t =
t (1 + ) ct;0
 + t (1 + ) ct;0
> 0;
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where the inequality follows from the assumption that t > 0: Finally, we can prove by reductio
ad absurdum that if t > 0, then k > 0 for all k > t: Suppose not, and 9k > t such that k > 0:
Then, for the argument provided in the proof of part 1 of this proposition, the non-negativity
constraint should be slack for all k0 < k, including k0 = t; raising a contradiction.
Finally, note that either the constraint t  0 is slack for all T; and then the rst best can be
implemented, or there exist a T such that the constraint is slack for all t < T and is binding for
all t  T:
B Estimation method of the rural-urban migration
In this appendix, we present the estimation method of the rural-urban migration. nh;i;j2000 and n
h;i;j
2005
represent the population of group (h; i; j) in the 2000 census and 2005 survey, respectively, where
h 2 fu; rg, i 2 ff;mg, and j 2 f0; 1;    ; 100g stand for residential status (u for urban and r for
rural residents), gender (f for females and m for males), and age, respectively. n^h;i;j2005 represents the
projected naturalpopulation in 2005. Denote mi;j the net ow of the rural-urban migration from
2000 to 2005. We observe nh;i;j2000 and n
h;i;j
2005 from the 2000 census and 2005 survey. Moreover, we can
use nh;i;j2000, together with the observed birth and mortality rates, to project n^
h;i;j
2005; i.e., the natural
population in 2005. In other words, both nh;i;j2005 and n^
h;i;j
2005 in (22) and (23) are observable. The 2005
urban and rural population gender-age structure can thus be composed into three parts:
nu;i;j2005 = n^
u;i;j
2005 +m
i;j + "u;i;j ; (22)
nr;i;j2005 = n^
r;i;j
2005  mi;j + "r;i;j ; (23)
where "h;i;j captures measurement errors in the census and survey.
In the ideal case with no measurement errors, either (22) or (23) can back out mi;j . The measure-
ment error on the total population,
P
h;i;j "
h;i;j , is small. When
P
h;i;j "
h;i;j = 0, (22) and (23) imply
that the projected total population,
P
h;i;j n^
h;i;j
2005, would be equal to the total population in the 2005
survey,
P
h;i;j n
h;i;j
2005. The di¤erence between
P
h;i;j n^
h;i;j
2005 and
P
h;i;j n
h;i;j
2005 is less than 1%.
37 However,
the match of the sum of the rural and urban population in each gender-age group is less perfect.
Figure A-1 plots the projected 2005 natural population gender-age structure (solid line) and the
2005 survey data (dotted line). The discrepancy between the two lines reveals the measurement error
on the population of each gender-age group, "i;j , where
"i;j 
X
h
"h;i;j =
X
h

nh;i;j2005   n^h;i;j2005

: (24)
Figure I suggests "i;j to be quantitatively important.38 To understand how "i;j a¤ects the estimated
migration gender-age structure, let us assume the measurement error on urban population, "u;i;j , is
proportional to "i;j :
"u;i;j =   "i;j ; (25)
37Despite the small discrepancy, to avoid biased estimates, we adjust nh;i;j2000 by a scale of , where  is calibrated to
1:0073 by matching the projected 2005 total population with the 2005 survey data.  = 1:0073 suggests the discrepancy
of the total population to be less than 1%.
38 If all the discrepancies are due to sampling errors in the 2005 survey, the comparison between the two lines in gure I
indicates that a major drawback of the 2005 survey is the undercounted young labor force (age 16 to 40). Our calculation
suggests 66 million young labor force (11% of total young labor force) missing from the 2005 survey.
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where  2 [0; 1]. It follows that the measurement error for the rural population is
"r;i;j = (1  )  "i;j : (26)
Rearranging (22) gives the net ow of migration:X
i
X
j
mi;j =
X
i
X
j

nu;i;j2005   n^u;i;j2005

  
X
i
X
j
"i;j (27)
=
X
i
X
j

nu;i;j2005   n^u;i;j2005

  
X
h
X
i
X
j

nh;i;j2005   n^h;i;j2005

:
The second equality comes from (24). Let us consider two extreme cases of . When  = 1, (27) can
be written asX
i
X
j
mi;j =
X
i
X
j
n^r;i;j2005| {z }
projected natural rural population
 
X
i
X
j
nr;i;j2005| {z }
rural population in the survey data
:
When  = 0, (27) reduces toX
i
X
j
mi;j =
X
i
X
j
nu;i;j2005| {z }
urban population in the survey data
 
X
i
X
j
n^u;i;j2005| {z }
projected naturalurban population
:
Therefore, the choice of  boils down to the choice of using rural or urban population to back out
migration. It has been widely acknowledged that the urban population survey tends to underestimate
the oating population, that is, rural migrants without hukou - the local household registration
status (e.g., Liang and Ma 2004). So, we set  = 1. We will discuss the results using  = 0:5.
It is instructive to compare the actual migration structure with our estimates. The migration ow
structure is hard to obtain. However, the migration stock structure may shed some light on the ow
structure. The age structure of migrants in the 2000 census is presented in the second row of Table
A-1, which has a high concentration in the 15-29 age group. The same pattern also appears in our
estimates under  = 1 (the third row).  = 0:5 results in a much more dispersed age structure (the
fourth row). This provides a justication for using  = 1.39
Table A-1 Age distribution of migration (percent)
age <15 15-29 30-44 45-59 60+
migration stock
in the 2000 census
9.0 60.5 22.2 5.8 2.5
estimated ow from
2000 to 2005 with  = 1
25.8 64.8 26.5 -8.6 -8.6
estimated ow from
2000 to 2005 with  = 0:5
17.8 39.5 27.7 8.9 6.1
Note: The age structure in the 2000 census is from Liang and Ma (2004).
39One caveat is that the data from the 2000 census are the age structure of narrowly dened migrants, whereas our
estimate is on broadly dened migrants including urbanized population.
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Finally, we compute mri;j , the agegender specic migration rate dened as the average annual
net ow of migration per hundred rural population with gender i and age j. We assume that mri;j is
time-invariant and the mortality rates for migrants are the same as those for rural residents. Then,
mi;j can be written as follows:
mi;j = mri;j 5nr;i;j 52000| {z }
migration of 2000

1  dr;i;j 12000

  

1  dr;i;j 52000

| {z }
survival rate from 2000 to 2005
+mri;j 4
 
1 mrr;j 5nr;i;j 52000| {z }
migration of 2001

1  dr;i;j 12000

  

1  dr;i;j 52000

| {z }
survival rate from 2001 to 2005
+mri;j 3
 
1 mrr;j 4  1 mrr;j 5nr;i;j 52000| {z }
migration of 2002

1  dr;i;j 12000

  

1  dr;i;j 52000

| {z }
survival rate from 2001 to 2005
+mri;j 2
 
1 mrr;j 3  1 mrr;j 4  1 mrr;j 5nr;i;j 52000| {z }
migration of 2003

1  dr;i;j 12000

  

1  dr;i;j 52000

| {z }
survival rate from 2001 to 2005
+mri;j 1
 
1 mrr;j 2     1 mrr;j 5nr;i;j 52000| {z }
migration of 2004

1  dr;i;j 12000

  

1  dr;i;j 52000

| {z }
survival rate from 2001 to 2005
:
Here, nr;i;j 52000 is the mortality rate of rural residents in the 2000 census. In other words, m
i;j measures
an accumulated migration stock from 2000 to 2005. The above equation allows us to back out the
age-gender specic migration rates. Specically, for j = J + 5:
mi;J+5 = mri;J n^r;i;J2000| {z }
migration of 2000

1  dr;i;J+42000

  

1  dr;i;J+42000

| {z }
survival rate from 2000 to 2005
) mri;J = m
i;J+5
nr;i;J2000

1  dr;i;J+42000

  

1  dr;i;J2000
 :
For j = J + 4:
mi;J+4 = mri;J 1n^r;i;J 12000| {z }
migration of 2000

1  dr;i;J+32000

  

1  dr;i;J 12000

| {z }
survival rate from 2000 to 2005
+mri;J
 
1 mrr;J 1nr;i;J 12000| {z }
migration of 2001

1  dr;i;J+32000

  

1  dr;i;J 12000

| {z }
survival rate from 2000 to 2005
) mri;J 1 =
mi;J+4  mri;Jnr;i;J 12000

1  dr;i;J+32000

  

1  dr;i;J 12000

(1 mri;J)nr;i;J 12000

1  dr;i;J+32000

  

1  dr;i;J 12000
 :
All the migration rates can thus be solved in a recursive way.
C Details on the Chinese pension system
This appendix provides a description of the basic features of the Chinese pension system. We start
with the urban pension system, and then provide a brief description of the rural pension system, which
has been introduced experimentally in 2009.
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C.1 The urban pension system
The pre-1997 urban pension system was primarily based on state and urban collective enterprises in
a centrally planned economy. Retirees received pensions from their employers, with replacement rates
that could be as high as 80 percent (see, e.g., Sin, 2005; OECD, 2007). The coverage was low in
the work-unit-based system, though. Many non-state-owned enterprises had no pension scheme for
their employees. The coverage rate, measured by the ratio of the number of workers covered by the
system to the urban employment, was merely 44% in 1992 according to China Statistical Yearbook
2009. The rapid expansion of the private sector caused a growing disproportion between the number
of contributors and beneciaries and, therefore, a severe nancial distress for the old system (Zhao and
Xu, 2002). To deal with the issue, the government initiated a transition from the traditional system
to a public pension system in the early 1990s. The new system was implemented nationwide after
the State Council issued A Decision on Establishing a Unied Basic Pension System for Enterprise
Workers (Document 26)in 1997.
The reformed system mainly consists of two pillars. The rst pillar, funded by 17% wage taxes
paid by enterprises, guarantees a minimum replacement rate of 20% of local average wage for retirees
with a minimum of 15 years of contribution. It is worth emphasizing that the pension fund is managed
by local governments (previously at the city level and now at the provincial level). The second pillar
provides pensions from individual accounts nanced by a contribution of 3% and 8% social security
tax paid by enterprises and workers, respectively. There is a third pillar adding to individual accounts
through voluntary contribution. The return of individual accounts is adjusted according to bank
deposit rates. The system also denes monthly pension benets from individual accounts equaling the
account balance at retirement divided by 120.
More recently, a new reform was implemented after the State Council issued A Decision on
Improving the Basic Pension System for Enterprise Workers (Document 38) in 2005. The reform
adjusted the proportion of taxes paid by enterprises and individuals and the proportion of contribution
for individual accounts. Individual accounts are now funded by the social security 8% tax paid by
workers only.40 The rst and second pillars deliver target replacement rates of 35% and 24.2%,
respectively (Hu, Stewart and Yermo, 2007).
Two features of the current urban pension system is particularly important for our modeling.
First, the pension reform was cohort-specic. There were three types of cohorts when the pension
reform took place: cohorts entering the labor market after 1997 (Xinren), cohorts retiring before
1997 (Laoren) and cohorts in-between (Zhongren). Pension contributions and benets of Xinren are
entirely determined by the new rule. According to Item 5 in Document 26, the government commits to
pay Laoren the same pension benets as those in the old system subject to an annual adjustment by
wage growth and ination. For Zhongren, their contributions follow the new rule, while their benets
consist of two components: (1) pensions from the new system identical to those for Xinren, and (2)
a transitional pension that smooths the pension gap between Laoren and Xinren. For simplicity, we
ignore Zhongren and take pensioners retiring before and after 1997 as Laoren and Xinren, respectively.
Following Sin (2005), we set the replacement rate for Laoren and Xinren to 78% and 60%, respectively.
Second, like private savings, pension funds are allowed to invest in domestic stock markets. The
40The reform also adjusted the pension benets. The replacement rate of an individual is now determined by years of
contribution: A one year contribution increases the replacement rate of a wage index averaged from local and individual
wages by one percentage point. However, the article did not state explicitly how to compute the wage index.
In practice, the index appears to di¤er across provinces. For instance, the increase in the average pension benets
per retiree in 2011 was almost the same across Beijing and GanSu (the monthly increase was RMB210 in Beijing and
RMB196 in GanSu), though the average wage in Beijing is more than two times as high as that in GanSu and the gap
has been rather stable over time.
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baseline model assumes the annual rate of returns to pension funds to be 2.5%, which is identical to
the rate of returns to private savings. According to the latest information released by the National
Council for Social Security Fund, the average share of pension funds invested in stock markets was
19.22% in 2003-2011.41 If 20% of pension funds have access to the market with an annual return of 6%
and the rest of the funds gain an annual return of 1.75% as the one-year bank deposits, the average
annual rate of returns would be equal to 2.6%, almost equal to 2.5% set in the baseline model.
It is also worth emphasizing that the actual urban pension system deviates from statutory regu-
lations in a number of ways and our model has been adapted to capture some major discrepancies.
First, the individual accounts are basically empty. Despite the recent e¤orts made by the central
government to fund these empty individual accounts, there are only 270 billion RMB in all individual
accounts of around 200 million workers participating in the urban pension system.42 Therefore, we
take the individual accounts as notional and ignore any distinction between the di¤erent pension pil-
lars throughout the paper. In addition, we assume that 40% of pension benets are indexed to wage
growth. The level of indexation is set on the conservative side since the actual level is between 40%
and 60% (see Sin, 2005).
Second, the statutory contribution rate including both basic pensions and individual accounts is
28%, of which 20% should be paid by rms and 8% should be paid by workers (see the above discussion
on Document 26 and 38). However, there is evidence that a signicant share of the contributions is
evaded. For instance, in the annual National Industrial Survey  which includes all state-owned
manufacturing enterprises and all private manufacturing enterprises with revenue above 5 million
RMB the average pension contributions paid by rms in 2004-2007 amounts to 11% of the average
wages, 9 percentage points below the statutory rate.43 Most evasion comes from privately owned
rms, whose contribution rate is a merely 7%.
The actual contribution rate is substantially lower than the statutory rate even for workers par-
ticipating in the system. A simple way of estimating the actual contribution rate conditional on
participation is to look at the following ratio:
BR  per retiree pension benets
per worker pension contributions

total pension fund expenditure
total retirees covered by the system
total pension fund revenue - government subsidy
total workers covered by the system
:
If the replacement rate is indeed 60%, a contribution rate of 28% would imply BR to be 2.1. However,
we nd that the average BR in the data from 1997 to 2009 is 3.1, much higher than 2.1 by the
statutory contribution rate. With a targeted replacement rate of 60%, the ratio of 3.1 would imply
an actual contribution rate of 19.4%.44 So, we set the actual contributkion rate to 20% in the paper.
Finally, although the coverage rate of the urban pension system is still relatively low, it has grown
from about 40% in 1998 to 57% in 2009, where we measure the coverage rate by the number of
41Source: http://www.ssf.gov.cn/xw/xw_gl/201205/t20120509_4619.html.
42The number of 270 billion RMB comes from the information released by the Ministry
of Human Resources and Social Security in the 2012 National Peoples Congress. Source:
http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2012npc/GB/239293/17320248.html
43 In addition, with a labor income share less than 20%, wages appear to be severely underreported.
44All the data are available from China Statistical Yearbook, except for the government subsidies. Fortunately, since
2010, the Ministry of Finance has started to publicize detailed expenditure items. The government subsidy to the pension
fund amounted to 191 billion RMB in 2010, accounting for 21% of the total government social security and employment
expenditure. We then use 21% to back out annual government subsidy to pension funds from annual total government
social security and employment expenditure, which is available from China Statistical Yearbook.
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employees participating in the pension system as a share of the number of urban employees.45 There
is a concern that the rapidly growing size of migrant workers might lead to downward-biased urban
employment. Our estimation suggests that the urban population (including migrants) between age 22
and 60 increases by 130 million from 2000 to 2009. A labor participation rate of 80% would imply an
increase of 104 million in the urban employment, whereas the increase by the o¢ cial statistics is 79
million. Restoring the 25 million missingurban employment would lower the pension coverage rate
from 57% to 53% in 2009. Our baseline model assumes a constant coverage rate of 60%, reecting a
trade-o¤ between the low coverage of the current pension system and the potentially higher one in the
future.
C.2 The rural pension system
The pre-2009 rural pension program had two features. First, it was fully-funded in the sense that
pension benets were essentially determined by contributions to individual accounts. Second, the
coverage rate was low since farmers did not have incentives to participate. A pilot pension program
was launched for rural residents in 2009. Like those in the urban pension system, the new rural
program entails two benet components. The rst one is referred to as basic pension, mainly nanced
by the Ministry of Finance, and the second one is referred to as pension from individual account.
If a migrant worker who joined the urban pension system returns to her home town, the money
accumulated in her account will be transferred to her new account in the rural pension program. The
program was rst implemented in 10% of cities and counties on a trial basis. The government targeted
to extend the program to 60% of cities and counties in 2011. Many of the cities and counties report
high participation rates (above 80%). This is not surprising since the program is heavily subsidized
(see below for more details).
We then lay out some basic features of the new program upon which the model is based. According
to Instructions on New Rural Pension Experiments issued by the State Council in 2009, the new
program pays a basic pension of RMB55 ($8.7) per month. Suppose that the rural wage equals the
rural per capita annual net income, which was RMB5153 in 2009 (China Statistical Yearbook 2010).
Then, the basic pension would correspond to a replacement rate of 12.8%. Notice that provinces are
allowed to choose more generous rural pensions. So, the replacement rate of 9% should be viewed
as a lower bound.46 In practice, some places set a much higher basic pension standard. Beijing,
for instance, increased the level to RMB280. The monthly basic pension in Shanghai has a range
from RMB150 to RMB300, dependent of age, years of contribution and status in the old pension
program.47 Since the rural per capita net income in Beijing and Shanghai is about 1.4 times higher
than the average level in China, a monthly pension of RMB280 would imply a replacement rate of
27.2%. In the quantitative exercise, we then set the replacement rate to 20% to match the average
of the basic level of 12.8% and the high level of 27.2%.48 On the contribution side, rural residents in
45Both numbers are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook 2010.
46The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security has made it clear that there is no upper bound for basic
pension and local governments may increase basic pension according to their public nancing capacity.
47See Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Beijing Urban-Rural Household Pension Plans, Beijing Municipal
Labor and Social Security Bureau, 2009 and Implementation Guidelines of State Councils Instructions on New Rural
Pension Experiments,Shanghai Municipal Government, 2010.
48All rural residents above age 60 are entitled to a basic pension. The only condition is that children of a basic
pension recipient, if any, should participate in the program. In practice, basic pension might be contingent on years of
contribution and status in the old pension program (see the above example from Shanghai).
In addition, an o¢ cial policy report from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
(http://news.qq.com/a/20090806/000974.htm) states that by the rule of the new system, a rural worker paying an
annual contribution rate of 4% for 15 years should be entitled to pension benets with a replacement rate of 25%.
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Delayed until 2050 Delayed until 2100 Fully Funded PAYGO
Planners discount rate high low high low high low high low
Baseline (ret. age at 60) 6.4% 0.9% 8.9% 0.6% -3.3% 0.2% 12.4% 1.6%
Retirement age at 57 9.9% 1.3% 13.4% 0.7% -3.2% 0.3% 11.8% 1.8%
Table 2: The table summarizes the welfare e¤ects (measured in terms of compensated variation in con-
sumption for the high- and low-discount rate planners, respectively) under the alternative assumption
about retirement age compared to the results under the baseline calibration.
principle should contribute 4% to 8% of the local average income per capita in the previous year. We
take the mean and set a contribution rate of 6%.49
The current pension program heavily relies on government subsidy. China Statistical Yearbook
2010 reports a rural population of 712.88 million. According to the 2005 one-percent population
survey, 13.7% of rural population is above age 60. These two numbers give a rural population of 97.66
million who are entitled to a basic pension. This, in turn, implies an annual government subsidy of
64.46 billion RMB, if monthly basic pension is set to RMB55. The central government revenue is 3592
billion RMB in 2009. So, a full-coverage rural pension program in 2009 would require subsidy as a
share of the central government revenue of 1.8% and a share of GDP of 0.19%.
D A retirement age of 57
In this section we report the results under an alternative calibration which assumes that the retirement
age is 57 instead of 60, as in the benchmark calibration. 57 is an average of the current statutory
retirement age for men (60) and women (55). We have opted for using a retirement age of 60 as a
benchmark because we expect that the pension age is likely to increase as the health of the population
improves with economic progress.
The scal imbalance of the system is now larger than under the baseline calibration. Consequently,
a larger reduction in replacement rate is required to balance the system. Under the draconian reform
the replacement rate now is 32.5%, compared to 39.1% in the baseline calibration. When the reform is
delayed until 2050 (2100), the required replacement rate fall to 28.0% (18.3%). The welfare results are
reported in Table 2. As is evident from the table, the main conclusions hold up, being even stronger in
the sense that delaying the reform would be even more benecial than under the baseline calibration.
E A dynamic general equilibrium model
In this section, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model that delivers the wage and interest
rate sequence assumed in the baseline model of section 2 as an equilibrium outcome. These prices are
su¢ cient to compute the optimal decisions of workers and retirees (consumption and labor supply)
as well as the sequence of budget constraints faced by the government. The model is builds on SSZ,
augmented with the demographic model of section 3.1 and the pension system of section 2.
The production sector: The urban production sector consists of two types of rms: (i) nan-
cially integrated (F) rms, modeled as standard neoclassical rms; and (ii) entrepreneurial (E) rms,
49Rural residents are allowed to contribute more. But the contribution rate cannot exceed 15% for each person.
Moreover, to be eligible for pension from individual account, a rural resident must contribute to the program for at least
15 years. The monthly pension benet is set equal to the accumulated money in individual account divided by 139 (the
same rule applied to the urban pension program).
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owned by (old) entrepreneurs, who are residual claimants on the prots. Entrepreneurs delegate the
management of their rms to specialized agents called managers. E rms can run more productive
technologies than F rms (see Song et al., 2011 for the microfoundation of this assumption). However,
they are subject to credit constraints that limit their growth. In contrast, the less productive F rms
are unconstrained. Motivated by the empirical evidence (see Song et al., 2011) that private rms
are more productive and more heavily nancially constrained than state-owned enterprises (SOE) in
China, we think of F rms as SOE and E rms as privately owned rms.
The technology of F and E rms are described, respectively, by the following production functions:
YF = K

F (ANF )
1  ; YE = KE (ANE)
1  ;
where Y is output and K and N denote capital and labor, respectively. The parameter  > 1
captures the assumption that E rms are more productive. A labor market-clearing condition requires
that NE;t + NF;t = Nt, where Nt denotes the total urban labor supply at t, whose dynamics are
consistent with the demographic model. The technology parameter A grows at the exogenous rate zt;
At+1 = (1 + zt)At.
The capital stock of F rms, KF;t, is not a state variable, since F rms have access to frictionless
credit markets, and the capital stock adjusts so that the rate of return on capital equals the lending
rate. Note that we assume no irreversibility in investments, so F rms can adjust the desired level of
capital in every period. Let rlt denote the net interest rate at which F rms can raise external funds.
Let w denote the market wage. Prot maximization implies that KF = ANF
 
=
 
rlt + 
  1
1  , where
 is the depreciation rate. The capital-labor ratio and the equilibrium are determined by rl: Thus,
wt  (1  )


rlt + 
 
1 
At: (28)
As long as there are active F rms in equilibrium (NF > 0), equation (28) holds with strict equality.
Let KE;t denote the capital stock of E rms. E rms are subject to an agency problem in the
delegation of control to managers. The optimal contract between managers and entrepreneurs requires
revenue sharing. We denote by  the share of the revenue accruing to managers.50 Prot maximization
yields, then, the following optimal labor hiring decision:
NEt = argmax
~Nt

(1   ) (KEt)

At ~Nt
1    wt ~Nt (29)
= ((1   )) 1

rlt + 

 1
1  KEt
At
:
The gross rate of return to capital in E rms is given by
E;t =

(1   )KEt (AtNEt)1    wtNEt + (1  )KEt

=KE;t: (30)
We assume that E rms are also subject to a credit constraint, modeled as in Song et al. (2011, p.
216). According to such a model, E rms can borrow funds at the same interest rate as F rms, but
the incentive-compatibility constraint of entrepreneurs implies that the share of investments nanced
externally must satisfy the following constraint:
50Managers have special skills that are in scarce supply. If a manager were paid less than a share  of production, she
could "steal" it. No punishment is credible, since the deviating manager could leave the rm and be hired by another
entrepreneur. See Song et al. (2011) for a more detailed discussion.
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KE   
E;t  E
1 + rl
KE ; (31)
where 
E;t denotes the stock of entrepreneurial wealth invested in E rms at t, and, hence, KE 
E;t
denotes the external capital of E rms. Thus, the constraint implies that the entrepreneurs can only
pledge to repay a share  of next-period net prots.
Three regimes are possible: (i) during the rst stage of the transition, the credit constraint (31)
is binding and F rms are active (hence, the wage is pinned down by (28) holding with equality); (ii)
during the mature stage of the transition, the credit constraint (31) is binding and F rms are inactive;
(iii) eventually, the credit constraint (31) ceases to bind (F rms remain inactive). In regimes (ii) and
(iii), (28) holds with strict inequality.
Consider, rst, regime (i). Substituting NEt and wt into (30) by their equilibrium expressions,
(28) and (29), yields the gross rate of return to E rms: E;t = (1   ) ((1   ))
1 

 
rlt + 

+
(1  ) : The corresponding gross rate of return to entrepreneurial investment is given by RE;t = 
E;tKE;t  
 
1 + rlt

(KE;t   
E;t)

=
E;t: We assume that (1   )
1
 
1 
 > 1; ensuring that the re-
turn to capital is higher in E rms than in F rms (i.e., that RE;t > rlt + 1). Note that the rate of
return to capital is a linear function of rlt in both E and F rms. The equilibrium in regime (i) is
closed by the condition that employment in the F sector is determined residually, namely,
NF;t = Nt   ((1   ))
1


rlt + 

 1
1  KEt
At
 0:
Consider, next, regime (ii), where only E rms are active (NE;t = Nt) and the borrowing constraint
is binding, so (31) holds with equality. In this case, the rates of return to capital and labor equal
their respective marginal products. More formally, wt = (1  ) (1   ) (At)1  (KE;t=Nt) ; and
the gross rate of return on entrepreneurial wealth is given by
E;t =
 
 (1   )1 

KEt
AtNt
 1
+ (1  )
!
;
whereas the borrowing constraint implies that KE;t =

1 +
E;t
Rl E;t


E;t: Given the stock of en-
trepreneurial wealth, 
E;t; the two last equations pin down E;t and KE;t: The rate of return to
entrepreneurial investment is then determined by the expression used for regime (i).
Finally, in regime (iii) the rate of return to capital in E rms is identical to the rate of return
o¤ered by alternative investment opportunities (e.g., bonds). Namely,
RE;t = 1 + r
l
t:
Thus,KE;t ceases to be a state variable, and the wage is given by wt = (1  )
 
=
 
rlt + 
=(1 )
At:
In all regimes, the law of motion of entrepreneurial wealth is determined by the optimal saving
decisions of managers and entrepreneurs, described below.
The rural production sector consists of rural rms whose technology is assumed to be similar to
that of urban F rms, YRt = K
R
Rt (RAtNRt)
1 R ; where R < 1. Like urban F rms, rural rms can
raise external funds at the interest rate rlt in each period, and adjust their capital accordingly. So, r
l
t
pins down capital-labor ratio and wage in the rural economy. This description is aimed to capture,
in a simple way, the notion that there are constant returns to labor in rural areas, due to, e.g., rural
overpopulation.
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Banks: Competitive nancial intermediaries (banks) with access to perfect international nancial
markets collect savings from workers and hold assets in the form of loans to domestic rms and
foreign bonds. Foreign bonds yield an exogenous net rate of return denoted by r, constant over time.
Arbitrage implies that the rate of return on domestic loans, rlt; equals the rate of return on foreign
bonds, which in turn must equal the deposit rate. However, lending to domestic rms is subject to
an iceberg cost, , which captures the operational costs, red tape, and so on, associated with granting
loans. Thus,  is an inverse measure of the e¢ ciency of intermediation. In equilibrium, rd = r and
rlt = (r + t) = (1  t) ; where rlt is the lending rate to domestic rms.
Householdssaving decisions: Workers and retirees face the problem discussed in section 2,
given the equilibrium wage sequence, and having dened R  1 + r. As in the previous section, we
hold xed the share of workers participating in the pension system.
The young managers of E rms earn a managerial compensation m: Throughout their experience
as managers, they acquire skills enabling them to become entrepreneurs at a later stage of their lives.
The total managerial compensation in period t equals Mt =  YE;t. Managers work for JE years, and
during this time can only invest their savings in bank deposits (as can workers) which yields an annual
gross return R. As they reach age JE + 1; they retire as managers, and have the option (which they
always exercise) to become entrepreneurs. In this case, they invest their wealth in their own business
yielding the annual return RE;t and hire managers and workers. Thereafter, they are the residual
claimants of the rms prots. We assume that entrepreneurs are not in the pension system. Their
lifetime budget constraint is then given by
JEX
j=0
sj
Rj
ct+j +
JX
j=JE+1
1
RJE
sj
t+jv=t+JE+1RE;
ct+j =
JEX
j=0
sj
Rj
mt+j :
The right hand-side is the PDV income from the managerial compensation. The left hand-side yields
the PDV of consumption. This is broken down in two parts: the rst term is the PDV of consumption
when young, when the manager faces a constant rate of return, R; the second part is the PDV
of consumption when being an entrepreneur, and is discounted at the rate R until JE , and at the
entrepreneurial rate of return thereafter.
Mechanics of the model: The dynamic model is dened up to a set of initial conditions including
the wealth distribution of entrepreneurs and managers, the wealth of the pension system, the aggregate
productivity (A0), and the population distribution. The engine of growth is the savings of managers
and entrepreneurs. If the economy starts in regime (i), then all managerial savings are invested in the
entrepreneurial business as soon as each manager becomes an entrepreneur. As long as managerial
investments are su¢ ciently large, the employment share of E rms grows and that of F rms declines
over time.
The comparative dynamics of the main parameters is as follows: (i) a high  implies a high
propensity to save for managers and entrepreneurs and a high speed of transition; (ii) a high world
interest rate (r) and/or a high iceberg intermediation cost () increases the lending rate, implying
a low wage, a high rate of return in E rms, a high managerial compensation, and, hence, a high
speed of transition; (iii) a high productivity di¤erential () implies a high rate of return in E rms,
a high managerial compensation, and, hence, a high speed of transition; (iv) a high  implies that
entrepreneurs can leverage up their wealth and earn a higher return on their savings, which speeds
up the transition; and (v) a high managerial rent ( ) implies a low rate of return in E rms, a high
managerial compensation, and, hence, has ambiguous (and generally non-monotonic) e¤ects on the
speed of transition.
Note that the savings of the worker do not matter for the speed of transition, because the lending
rate o¤ered by banks depends only on the world market interest rate and on the iceberg cost.
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E.1 Calibration
In SSZ, we show that a calibrated version of the model outlined in the previous section matches well
a number of salient macroeconomic trends for the recent period. In particular, the model reproduces
realistic trends for output growth, wage growth, return to capital, transition from state-owned to
private rms, and foreign surplus accumulation. The current model - which incorporates additional
features including demographics and the pension system - the model is calibrated to match the same
macroeconomic trends after 2000.
We must calibrate two parameters related to the nancial system,  and , and four technology
parameters, ; ;  and  . The parameters  and  are set exogenously:  = 0:5 so that the capital
share of output is 0.5 in year 2000 (Bai et al., 2006), and  = 0:1 so that the annual depreciation rate
of capital is 10%.
The remaining parameters are calibrated internally, so as to match a set of empirical moments.
We set the parameters  and  so that the model is consistent with two key observations: (i) the
capital-output ratio in E rms is 50% of the corresponding ratio in F rms (as documented by SSZ
for manufacturing industries, after controlling for three-digit industry type), (ii) the rate of return on
capital is 9% larger in E rms than in F rms.51 The implied parameter values are  = 0:27 and
 = 2:73. This implies that the TFP of an E rm is 1:65 times larger than the TFP of an F rm.52
We set  so as to target an average gross return on capital of 20% in year 2000 (Bai et al., 2006).
With  = 10%, this implies an average net rate of return on capital of 10%. This average comprises
both F rms and E rms. Since the DPE employment share in the period 1998-2000 was on average
10%, this implies F = 9:3%, so that the initial value for  is 2000 = 0:062. After year 2000, we assume
that there is gradual nancial improvement so  falls linearly to zero by year 2024. The motivation for
such decline is twofold. First, we believe it is reasonable that banks improve their lending practices
over time, so that borrowing-lending spreads will eventually be in line with corresponding spreads in
developed economies. Second, a falling  will generate capital deepening in F rms and E rms due to
cheaper borrowing and higher wages, respectively. Such development helps the model to generate an
increasing aggregate investment rate during 2000-2009, which is a clear pattern of aggregate data. If
 were constant, the model would predict a falling rate (see Song et al., 2011, for further discussion).
We set  = 0:43, so that entrepreneurs can borrow 87 cents for each dollar in equity in 2000. This
value for  implies that the growth in the DPE employment share is in line with private employment
growth between 2000 and 2008 in urban areas. We set the initial level of productivity, A2000, so
that the GDP per capita is 8.3% of the US level in 2000. This yields a GDP per capita equal to
20% of the US level in 2010, in line with the data. Moreover, we set the growth rate of At (i.e., the
secular exogenous productivity growth) so that the model generates an average labor income growth
(controlling for human capital) of 7.5% between 2000-2013. The resulting growth rate in At is 2.1%
larger than the associated world TFP growth rate during this period. After 2010, the growth rate of
At in excess of the long-run world rate falls linearly to zero until the TFP level in E rms reaches
that of US rms. This occurs in year 2022. Thereafter, the TFP grows at the long-run world rate.
Finally,  is calibrated to 1:0164 to match the average aggregate urban household saving rate of 25%
in 2000-2010.
In the rural sector, we set R = 0:3 to match the observed 20% investment rate in the rural area
in 2000. The technology gap R is set to 0:75 to capture an observed urban-rural wage gap of 1:84 in
51Song et al. (2011) document that manufacturing, domestic private enterprises (DPE) have on average a ratio of
prots per unit of book-value capital 9% larger than that of SOEs during the period 1998-2007. A similar di¤erence in
rate of return on capital is reported by Islam, Dai, and Sakamoto (2006).
52Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate TFP across manufacturing rms in China and nd that the TFP of DPEs is
about 1.65 times larger than the TFP of SOEs.
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2000. The rural wage grows over time, due to the exogenous technology growth and to the decreasing
lending rate. The rural-urban wage gap implied by the model increases from 1:84 in 2000 to 3:48 in
2040 and stays constant thereafter (see gure VI in the appendix).
The initial conditions are set as follows. Total entrepreneurial wealth in 2000 is set equivalent
to 14.6% of urban GDP so that the 2000 DPE employment is 20%. The distribution of that entre-
preneurial wealth is obtained by assuming that all entrepreneurs are endowed with the same initial
wealth in 1995. The initial wealth for workers, retirees, and managers is set so as to match as the 1995
empirical age distribution of nancial wealth for urban households from CHIP. The 2000 distribution
of wealth across individuals is then derived endogenously. Finally, the initial government wealth is set
to 96% of GDP in 2000 so as to generate a net foreign surplus equal to 12% of GDP in 2000.53
E.2 Simulated output trajectories
The calibrated model yields growth forecasts that we view as plausible. Figure II shows the evolution
of productivity and output per capita forecasted by our model. The growth rate of GDP per worker
remains about 7.5% per year until 2020 (see upper panel). After 2020, productivity growth is forecasted
to slow down. This is driven by two forces: (i) the end of the transition from state-owned to private
rms and (ii) the slowdown in technological convergence. The growth rate remains above 7.2% between
2020-2030 and eventually dies o¤ in the following decade. Note that the growth of GDP per capita
is lower than that of GDP per worker after 2013, due to the increase in the dependency ratio. On
average, China is expected to grow at a rate of 6.5% between 2013 and 2040. The contribution of
human capital is 0.8% per year, due to the entry of more educated young cohorts in the labor force.
In this scenario, the urban GDP per worker in China will be 73% of the US level by 2040, remaining
broadly stable thereafter. The corresponding GDP per capita of China is 68% of the US level in 2040.
Total GDP in China is set to surpass that in the United States in 2013 and to become more than
twice as large in the long run.
The wage sequence that was assumed in section 2 is now an endogenous outcome. Wages are
forecasted to grow at an average of 4.9% until 2031 and to slow down thereafter. What keeps wage
growth high after 2020 is mostly capital deepening.54
E.2.1 Sensitivity: high savings and foreign surplus
Although the growth forecasts are plausible, the calibrated economy generates a very large amount
of savings. For instance, in 2065 the economy has a wealth-GDP ratio exceeding 1000%. This is
because the model is calibrated to match urban household saving during 2000-2010. In that period,
China experienced high growth and yet a very high saving rate (a total savings rate of 48.2%, and a
household savings rate of 25%).
Since our stylized model forecasts an eventual decline in growth, the intertemporal motive would
suggest that consumption should have been high before 2010. Therefore, the model requires a suf-
ciently high discount factor ( = 1:0164) in order to predict the empirical saving rate during the
rst decade of the 21st century. In our model, a high  is a stand-in for a number of institutional
53More precisely, government wealth is calculated as a residual. It is equal to the sum of foreign surplus and domestic
capital (from both SOE and DPE) minus the stock of private wealth owned by workers and entrepreneurs.
54 In Section 4 we held the wage sequence constant across the di¤erent policy experiments. However, in the general
equilibrium model of this section, the wage sequence is endogenous and would in general be a¤ected by alternative
reforms. In particular, pension reforms impact labor supply through a wealth e¤ect, and this inuences the capital
accumulation dynamics during transition. Since the e¤ects are quantitatively small, the results are omitted and are
available upon request.
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features that are not explicitly considered and that may explain a high propensity to save over and
beyond pure preferences (e.g., large precautionary motives or large downpayment requirements for
house purchases).55
Since it seems implausible that China will continue to save so much, we consider an alternative
scenario, where all cohorts entering the labor market after 2013 have  = 0:97. In such an alternative
scenario Chinas net foreign position would be zero in the long run. The analysis of the alternative
pension arrangements discussed in the previous sections yields essentially the same results as in the
high  economy. Thus, the calibration of  is unimportant for the e¤ects of the welfare analysis, which
is the main contribution of this paper.
This nding is not surprising since long-term wages and GDP do not hinge on the domestic
propensity to save. Although the entrepreneurs propensity to save determines the speed of the
transition, this does not to matter much for welfare (see section 5.1).
E.2.2 Sensitivity: Financial development
The model borrows from SSZ the assumption that E rms are nancially constrained. Note that the
salience of the nancial constraints declines over time as E rms accumulate capital. As the economy
enters regime (iii), which occurs in 2040, the nancial constraint ceases to bind.
In our baseline calibration, the parameter , which regulates borrowing of private rms, is assumed
to be constant over time. An exogenous increase in  for example, due to nancial development 
would speed up growth of private rms. Wage growth would accelerate earlier, although the long-run
wage level would be una¤ected.
To study the e¤ects of nancial development on pension reform, we consider a stark experiment
in which the borrowing constraint on private rms is completely removed in 2013. This means that
state-owned rms vanish, and there is large capital inow driven by entrepreneurial borrowing. Wages
jump upon impact (by 88%) due to the large capital deepening. In 2030, the wage level is still 18.5%
above the baseline calibration. In 2040 the wage level is the same as in the benchmark calibration.
Although nancial development a¤ects the transition path, it brings little change to the conclu-
sions of the welfare analysis.56 The benchmark reform requires a slightly smaller reduction of the
replacement rate: 39.8% instead of 39.1%. The delayed reform still entails gains for the transition
cohorts, albeit these gains decline faster over time. For instance, delaying a reform until 2050 yields
a 17% consumption equivalent gain for the cohort retiring in 2013, but only a 10.5% gain for the
cohort retiring in 2049. The losses su¤ered by the cohorts retiring after 2050 are comparable in size
to those in the baseline scenario without nancial development. The gains accruing to the high- and
low-discount planners are, respectively, 5.3% and 0.5% (6.4% and 0.9% in the baseline scenario).
The FF reform yields slightly better outcomes. All generations retiring after 2050 gain from the
reform (2060 in the baseline scenario), and the losses of the earlier cohorts only reach 7% (11% in
the baseline scenario). The high-discount planner continues to prefer the benchmark reform to the
FF reform, whereas the low-discount planner continues to have the opposite ranking. The PAYGO
reform yields even larger gains to the earlier cohorts. Both the high- and the low-discount social
planners continue to prefer the PAYGO reform to any alternative policy-driven reform. However,
the welfare gap between the PAYGO and the fully funded reform is now smaller, since the planners
dislike the concentrated nature of the gains under the PAYGO reform. For instance, the consumption
55Chamon et al. (2013) and Song and Yang (2010) study household savings in calibrated life-cycle models. They
incorporate individual risk and detailed institutional features of the pension system and nd that their models are
qualitatively consistent with the life-cycle prole of household saving rates. However, both studies nd that with a
conventional choice of , their models would imply quantitatively too low savings for the young households.
56We focus for simplicity on the policy-driven reforms, and we omit an explicit analysis of the optimal policy.
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equivalent gain of the low-discount planner relative to the benchmark reform is 1%, compared with
1.7% in the baseline scenario. Since the fully funded reform also entails a 0.5% gain relative to the
benchmark reform, the consumption equivalent gain of the PAYGO relative to the FF reform is only
0.5% (although it remains signicantly higher, 12.4%, for the high-discount planner).
In conclusion, nancial development mitigates but does not change the welfare implications of
alternative reforms.
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APPENDIX FIGURES
In this section, we provide the appendix gures.
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Figure I: The upper panel shows the female population of di¤erent ages in 2005, in the survey data
(solid line), and in our simulation (dashed line). The lower panel shows the male population in 2005.
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Figure II: The upper panel shows projected annual growth rates in GDP per worker and GDP per capita in
the calibrated economy. The lower panel shows projected GDP per capita in levels for China and the US.
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Figure III: The gure shows the assumed hourly wage rate per unit of human capital in urban areas, normalized
to 100 in 2000. The solid line is the assumed wage process and the dashed line is the wage process consistent
with the endogenous outcome of the general equilibrium model of section E. Note that the two lines are almost
indistinguishable.
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Figure IV: The gure shows the average number of years of schooling for di¤erent age cohorts in
China. Source: Barro and Lee data set. The values after 1990 are (linearly) extrapolated, assuming
the growth in schooling accumulation stagnates at 12 years.
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Figure V: Panel (a) shows the replacement rate qt for the case when the reform is delayed until 2100 (solid
line) versus the benchmark reform (dashed line). Panel (b) shows tax revenue and expenditures, expressed as
a share of aggregate urban labor income (benchmark reform is dashed and the delay-until-2100 is solid). Panel
(c) shows the evolution of government debt, expressed as a share of aggregate urban labor income (benchmark
reform is dashed and the delay-until-2100 is solid). Negative values indicate surplus.
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Figure VI: The gure shows the projected hourly wage rate per unit of human capital in urban (dashed line)
and rural (continuous line) areas, normalized to 100 in rural areas in 2000. The process is the endogenous
outcome of the general equilibrium model of section E.
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 Welfare Gain (Equiv. Variation) by Year of Retirement
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Figure VII: As in gure (6), the solid lines show welfare gains of alternative reforms relative to the benchmark
reform for each cohort, but now under the assumption that all the reforms are perfectly anticipated at 2000.
The dashed lines are the welfare gains in the baseline scenario, as in gure (6). The gains (!) are expressed as
percentage increases in consumption.
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Figure VIII: The migration ow (i.e., the number of migrants per year) in the slow migration and
basline scenarios are shown with the solid and dashed lines, resepectively. The migration ow is
smaller in the slow migration scenario than in the basline scenario before 2038, but larger afterwards.
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